Prof. Bacevich Deflates COIN-Happy Crowd of 1,400
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There was a moment when it seemed the swollen Washington crowd attending the annual meeting of the Center for a New American Security might get so pumped up by its own mission of salvation for the broader Middle East and Central Asia that it could take off like a rocket ship of its own self-satisfaction into the stratosphere.
Then Professor Andrew Bacevich stepped onto the dais. His shock of silver-white hair and seeming immunity to corny inside COIN (counterinsurgency) jokes weren’t the only traits distinguishing him from the rest. In nearly four hours of remarks this morning, he was the only one to question the accepted orthodoxy of “population-centric” counterinsurgency as the new reality — and only remedy — for winning the war and serving American interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. Everyone here at the posh Willard Hotel has seemingly genuflected to this meme as the price of admission. Bacevich not only jumped the toll, but brought the grand ballroom, at least for a few moments, crashing down to earth.
After listening to Gen. David Petraeus, Ambassador Nicholas Burns and two panels discussing the glories of the Iraq Surge and CNAS’ proposals for extending U.S. involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan — a “long term effort” that would incorporate the nearly 68,000 boots planned for Afghanistan, a civilian “surge” of diplomats, foreign service officers and aid workers and helping retool government institutions and security forces in all three countries — Bacevich asks, why?
If threat of armed insurgencies and drugs and protecting natural resources and the U.S sphere of influence is so vital in determining our “semi-permanent occupation and pacification of foreign countries,” Bacevich asked, “why not a have a goal of ‘fixing’ Mexico?” (nervous chuckle from the suits in the audience). If anyone here, however, suggested putting nearly 70,000 U.S troops into Mexico and tens, if not billions of dollars into building schools, combating government corruption and fighting drugs, “he would be laughed out of the room.”
But when national security experts issue the same plans for Afghanistan, he said, “they are treated like sages.” This was a dig, direct or not, at his hosts, namely Andrew Exum, senior fellow at CNAS, and Nathaniel Fick, soon-to-be CEO of CNAS ( current CEO, Kurt Campbell is about to be confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State for Asia and Pacific Affairs). Exum and Fick, Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans both, had been flattered all morning as the fresh-faced scholars behind the COIN movement and authors of the new CNAS report, “Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afhganistan and Pakistan,” which pretty much assures some U.S occupation of Afghanistan for long, long time and assumes a lot more — that the U.S can arrest “the downward spiral” of conditions in Afghanistan by helping to build sustainable security forces, “clear, hold and build” current insurgent strongholds, and make people “feel safe” enough to create a space for democratic governance to seed and flourish.
“This only testifies to the distortion of U.S national security priorities after 9/11 and it is still lingering today,” retorts Bacevich. To which Exum replied, “[Bacevich's critique] is completely divorced from the political reality facing this administration.” What he meant by this isn’t quite clear. Perhaps it is divorced from the political reality that CNAS and others in the conventional Washington defense establishment, not unlike the neoconservatives dominating the town during the last administration, have pinpointed and prioritized, if not promoted themselves.
But Bacevich — the only working historian on the bench — reminded that the assumption the United States could orchestrate the fate of the Middle East, if not the entire Islamic world, by meddling in political and military endeavors on such a grand scale, began during the Carter Administration and has “turned out to be an enormously expensive proposition, and it has not, to this point, delivered any meaningful benefit to the United States of America.”
“There ought to be enough room to reconsider our approach to US national security policy,” and to look at alternatives, “instead of continuing down this path.”
To this Exum replied, “what is the alternative?”
I don’t think the bulk of the people at this event — sponsored, by the way, by a bevy of defense contractors — Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Aegis and SAIC to name a few — were quite ready to hear the answer. But there was a decided shift in the air from there. That tends to happen when you let the proverbial skunk into the echo chamber.
UPDATE: As pointed out, the positions of Andrew Exum and Kurt Campbell were misidentified above. Exum is a fellow, not a senior fellow, at CNAS, while Campbell is expected to be confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, not Deputy Secretary of State for Asia and Pacific Affairs.
Filed under: Iraq, Uncategorized, War
Exum: Bacevich’s critique is “completely divorced from the political reality facing this administration”…”“what is the alternative?”
What is the alternative to war profiteering? What is the alternative to the politics of the military-industrial complex? How about libertarianism in the vein of the American Founders? How about dismantling a Soviet like federal government and letting the religious marketplace of ideas regain its moral authority? Anathema to Statists and money worshippers. These people have absolutely no understanding of what made America great, and what is driving it into the ground. All they can see is dollar signs and the reflection in the mirror that they are so in love with: the self image of themselves pulling the levers that move the world. Pathetic.
Our mission failed in Afghanistan — capturing bin Laden and killing al Quaida. We have apparently shifted our mission to the preservation of the government we installed and, perhaps, the salvation of the women and girls of Afghanistan. My sadness at our departure would extend to the females who will be subjected to the grotesque rules of middle-east Muslim society. But depart, we must, and soon. We can’t afford to continue to prop up the kleptocracy in Kabul and continue to fight dedicated and suicidal Taliban fighters. We had a chance, but blew it when we decided to be nice to the current government of Afghanistan and to let the poppy fields alone.
We should declare defeat, and go. Our soldiers will be needed elsewhere.
I think Bacevich goes off track at times but prescriptively, he is far more in touch with reality than the policy whores he was addressing.
Petraeus’s handbook on counterinsurgency reads like every such manual. Every army has to learn the same lessons when dealing with guerillas. A lot of what he wrote reminded me of General Melenthin’s commentary on General Balck’s tactics against the Russian partisans. None of this helps when you are just in the wrong place performing the wrong mission.
Let’s just kill Bin Laddhin and his close buddies and leave. With all that opium revenue the Afghan government can hire Muslim mercenaries to secure their border with Pakistan.
Bachevich has all the credentials-career military, West Point grad, Vietman vet, historian- most of the Washington elite and many think tank jokers can only dream about.
His basic tenant of how our foreign policies are actually risking our national security rather than protecting it, is right on.
Unfortuntely, we don’t have enough brave Americans like Bacevich with the credentials to take on on the punks and thugs that shape and manage our foriegn policies.
“That tends to happen when you let the proverbial skunk into the echo chamber.”
Umm, when you invite someone who disagrees with you to speak at your own event, its not an echo chamber. Its called intelectual integrity. But I guess youre too busy getting ready to assault “Obamas military folly” to concede such points?
The heart of the problem in Afghanistan is that having toppled the Taliban government but failed to destroy Al Queda central command, we decided to stay to keep the Taliban from returning to power. This is a fools errand if we cannot persue them into Pakistan. So we should leave with the understanding that if a hostile Jihadist regime emerges, we will just keep repeating the procedure until they get the message. It’s a lot cheaper to prosecute limited offensive operations than occupy a country.
“credentials. . . . most of the Washington elite and many think tank jokers can only dream about.”
Right. Apparently you missed the part about Nagl – Oxford PhD, West Point, etc. Or Fick – Dartmouth, Marine Corps, Harvard grad school . . . or Exum – Penn, Army officer, etc.
What’s really funny is that Bacevich’s critiques, as made also in his book “the Limits of Power” are fairly anathema to conservativism as practiced in the last eight years. The American Conservative and it’s illustrious comments-folk seem to forget that what Bacevich rails against is the military/imperial policy-subbing-for-foreign-policy, increased spending while cutting taxes, energy-use-profligate policies of the last thirty years, which were – albeit done by both parties – more often than not enacted by Republicans. So a bunch of “conservative” Republicans fawning over the man who has repeatedly and loudly damned you all is priceless.
As far as Afghanistan itself, Bacevich’s critique of Long War strategy as a whole is very valid – the article today about AQ leadership relocating to Yemen and Somalia is a perfect example. We’re not gonna chase them around the world, transforming states and societies as we go.
But what Professor Bacevich has not done is demonstrate how a precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan – a war we are already in and have committed so much to – is beneficial to our national security.
“Bacevich asked, “why not a have a goal of ‘fixing’ Mexico?” (nervous chuckle from the suits in the audience). If anyone here, however, suggested putting nearly 70,000 U.S troops into Mexico and tens, if not billions of dollars into building schools, combating government corruption and fighting drugs, “he would be laughed out of the room.”
Given Mexico’s downward spiral into narco-insurgency, none of us may be laughing two years from now – particularly because Mexico’s problems with decentralized but organized violence will not be confined to the Mexican side of the border. It is leaking across right now, hence the nervous laughter from the suits.
MattC86 said:
“So a bunch of “conservative” Republicans fawning over the man who has repeatedly and loudly damned you all is priceless”
You, sir, have obviously never read The American Conservative.
Campbell is ‘about to be confirmed’ as Assistant Secretary for Asia and the Pacific, not as Deputy Secretary. Professor Bacevich could have said that, whatever the reaction to the proposal now, one hundred years ago, nobody would have been laughed out of the room for suggesting putting US troops into Mexico, because that’s precisely where US troops were heading. Maybe there’s been progress here. Just like some jihadis, the US now focuses on the Far Enemy, not the Near Enemy. Or maybe that’s no big deal, and the Center that Bacevich was addressing should be re-named the Center for an Old American Security. Thankfully, President Obama is introducing some doctrinal clarity into this debate. In Cairo, he explained that resistance through violence and killing is wrong and never succeeds. This is an argument that the late King George III would have loved. Violence and killing are surely only justified as a response to resistance.
[...] “The Bacevich Alternative” Posted on June 12, 2009 by Rob Wow. That must have been some event: [...]
Mr Vlahos,
Indeed I have not, and for that I guess I owe an apology for my snarky comment.
However, the idea that the CNAS crowd is some imperialistic group full of their own power is ludicrous. The whole COIN community, whatever its faults – and those most certainly exist – argues what it does precisely because so many have seen their buddies and innocent civilians die in the poor application of force by a conventional military. Bacevich’s argument is policy and to a lesser extent, strategy centered. No more interventions; they’re inherently imperial, expensive, and not worth it. Fine.
The “COINdinista” argument is more tactical, operational, and to an extent strategic. Political bodies have decided we’re not precipitously withdrawing from the wars we’re in. How do we achieve the desirable conditions so that we can get out someday?
What’s the worst case if both are wrong?
For the COIN crowd, it’s continued involvment in costly wars that are ongoing right now anywaym
If Bacevich is wrong, and our military gets out of this “COIN business” (again), and insurgency and intrastate violence threatening the security of us and our allies become the norm in the 21st century, we will again see an American Army of big battalions and heavy firepower disastrously misapplied in conflicts, much to our collective detriment.
I say that’s a much worse outcome.
In any case, Bacevich’s argument is best given to the politicians of all parties who wish to start these operations of “imperial overstretch.” If he is worried about a COIN-able force encouraging policymakers to undertake more expensive and unending full-scale nationbuilding efforts, that’s fine. Attacking the CNAS crowd which seeking to win the wars we’re in – not start more as you suggest – is flawed.
Matt
Bacevich does not, in fact, offer an alternative. He proposes a childish abdication of responsibility for our own security cloaked in doctoral robes. In fact, Bacevich was a terrible choice as a dissenter to help critique the recommendations of the CNAS report, because he talks past the report, failing to provide a viable alternative.
I consider myself conservative, and I feel that conservatives are failing this nation because they are not being a meaningful participant in the national conversation. Articles like this, with its thinly veiled sarcasm and use of the word, “meme,” is dismissive and does not add meaningfully to the national conversation. This article basically just abuses CNAS and proponents of effective counterinsurgent behaviors and does not offers neither a coherent critique nor a viable alternative other than, apparently, quitting.
Having served in Afghanistan, I see the results of such immediate disengagements on our reputation in the world. The biggest fear of many common Afghans is that we will leave. It is our demonstrated pattern of action in the recent past. We have a history of rushing in, buggering things up, and leaving. Bacevich’s isolationist theories are based on a history devoid of the effects of globalization, something that Americans have been singularly unsuccessful at coming to grips with, both in business and in foreign policy. The fact is that we are part of a global system, and we can either recognize it and our ability to influence it positively, or we can bury our heads in the sand and suffer the consequences.
By failing to grasp realities, conservatives have abdicated any meaningful role in influencing the developing doctrines and foreign policy behaviors that will shape our role over the course of the next 50 to 100 years. As societies around the world shape and are shaped by their emergence into the technologies that have hastened globalization, far too many conservatives are clutching buggy whips. This, being apparent to significant portions of the population who would be otherwise amenable to conservative ideas, destroys the credibility of conservative thinking as being outmoded and ineffective… or crazy (see the first comment in this string.) Talk about putting off a reasonable human being seeking information upon which to base an opinion.
Articles such as this one… which, unfortunately, is indicative of the Rush Limbaugh school of “journalism” that is alienating those in the middle who are open to reasonable influence.
So, as a conservative libertarian who cannot cast his vote symbolically towards a Libertarian candidate because I don’t like wasting my vote on “making a statement,” and therefore being left with a choice of Republicans who, when represented by articles of such incoherence, are just plain out of touch with reality, what is a conservative voter who seeks to preserve individual liberty to do? It’s all boiling down to pissing down a well at this point. Conservatives must either gain some sense of reality in the modern world or we shall all be dragged into socialism not only by the liberal left but by the irrelevance of those who “speak” for “conservatives.”
Thanks for failing us, guys. I blame liberals for plenty, but I blame dinosaurs like you for failing to be relevant just as much.
Just a Voice,
I opposed the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 and I was told by conservative Republicans that I wasn’t “with the program.”
So, I watch quietly as more than 4,300 U.S soldiers, Marines, Air Force and Navy are killed, more than 50,000 wounded, and a country torn asunder by sectarian cleansing. Today, millions of Iraqis remain displaced because they are afraid to go home, the country’s infrastructure and social fabric remains in shambles, there has been a massive brain drain and long-term psychological trauma on an inconceivable level. An authoritarian “strong man” wielding U.S-created special forces like his own personal republican guard is now considered Iraq’s best hope. And I’m considered a fool for not believing the Surge worked.
When George W. Bush was reelected in 2004, I was called a “cynic” for not believing in his scheme to spread democracy across the globe while continuing to hold hands with Saudi princes and Egyptian autocrats who put their political opponents in jail. I was called a “pessimist” — by conservatives who said they were my friends — for calling Afghanistan a failure, and that was back in 2007.
Now, I am told that Afghanistan is deteriorating further than ever, and a new generation of Democratic policy hot shots want me to believe I have to support a “long term commitment” to resolve Afghanistan with an untested, unproven remedy that requires not only billions of more dollars, but tens of thousands of more American troops on the ground. Troops, as you know, who will be on their third, if not fourth tour overseas. Servicemen and women who are already coming home with varying degrees of brain injuries, unidentified illnesses relating to harmful environmental exposures (i.e. burn pits) and post traumatic stress disorder. Our VA health care system treated more than 400,000 OIF/OEF veterans since the beginning of the war — how much more are we willing to grind up and spit out for an amorphous plan with no timelines, no benchmarks, no guarantees and really, no exit strategy?
For these questions, I am called a “dinosaur,” an “isolationist,” and a “Rush Limbaugh” journalist. I am belittled, apparently, because I did not serve, and am “out of touch with reality” because I dare to take a different view of what my government is doing, in my name, overseas.
My observations meant very little in Washington then, and they are just as marginal now. The Long War is on and it’s all ad hominem attacks for anyone who questions it. I don’t strive to be “relevant,” just a human being, who has seen too many suffer under current war policies in Iraq and Afghanistan. I am thus cheered whenever I hear someone like Prof. Bacevich have the guts to challenge the latest unquestioned orthodoxy the way he did on Thursday; I feel less so when I hear the reactions from readers like you, because it is obvious you haven’t spent a minute trying to figure out what we are all about here.
—- KV
Kelley,
My problem here is that some of your observations are, well, off. On top of your incorrectly identifying the positions of a couple of these people (Campbell and Exum), which shows poor journalistic effort at least, your rendering of the events is plain wrong.
Bacevich was invited for just this reason – to provide a dissenting voice (even though two other panelist, COL Cavoli and LTG Barno provided a much better voice). And his comments did not bring the ballroom “crashing down to earth.” As I was sitting pretty close to you, I’m sure you also heard and saw at least 50 to 100 people clap loudly (with quite a few standing) at the end of Dr. Bacevich’s comments. This conference was not a pep rally for the COIN community.
You also conveniently left out a few other occurrences. Like Exum agreeing that Bacevich had some important strategic questions, but that didn’t help commanders on the ground today. And you should know very well what he meant by “divorced from political reality.” I would assert that he means (I don’t speak for him, but read his blog daily) that the President has made a decision that we’re going to do COIN in Afghanistan and the point of that paper and that panel was to address how to do that best. Bacevich’s whole argument was being made in a vacuum in that forum because it exceeded the scope of dialog past the operational level.
And again, go listen or watch the panel. COL Cavoli tore down the paper pretty well and did so in a manner that kept to the topic at hand. Which was important as he’s going to command one of those brigades over there next year.
Bacevich raised many important strategic questions and issues that should be examined, but probably in a different forum. To call him “courageous” (as some have) or the event an “echo chamber” distorts the reality of the event.
What is this vague “political reality” that Exum keeps referring to? It is certainly never explained in detail.
The fact is, if there are no wars to fight, the people at places like CNAS, especially the counter-insurgents, are far less relevant to the policy arena. They all have an interest in the “political reality” being shaped in a certain way, to support fighting counter-insurgencies in places like Afghanistan. If there are no COINS to be fought, what would they have to talk about?
At the risk of both entering into an echo-chamber conversation myself and being labeled a shill for CNAS, they do a lot of work in the arenas of “natural security”, Asia/Pacific affairs, and how/implication of when we do pull out of these conflicts. They actually haven’t published much recently (other than the paper at hand) on COIN in and of itself. So that’s what they would talk about.
Just a voice:
Despite having read your post a number of times I simply can’t understand your argument.
In the first place you take up Bacevich for supposedly not having any options, but of course his option was that we not invade Iraq in the first place and, I’m pretty sure, we didn’t stay in Afghanistan after trying to get bin Laden and try to “nation-build” it.
But as to your own option, here’s what you say:
“Having served in Afghanistan, I see the results of such immediate disengagements on our reputation in the world. The biggest fear of many common Afghans is that we will leave. It is our demonstrated pattern of action in the recent past. We have a history of rushing in, buggering things up, and leaving.”
Ergo, the solution according to you then is that we *stay*? For how long? Longer than the Brits tried in India? 25 years? 50? 100?
The problem is that a goodly chunk of the entire history of the last century is that colonialist/imperialist adventures have *never* seemed to get it right. They’ve *always* had to leave because, gee, it turns out that people tend not to like seeing their country occupied.
And of *course* the bulk of the Afghanis that talked to you and etc. seemed to fear you leaving; that always happens in colonial/imperial adventures, and even leads the colonialists and imperialists to believe “the people” love them. Except that that’s a self-selecting group; by *definition* the ones who deal with you are the ones who, in the main, don’t mind your presence or, more likely, see some advantage for themselves in you being there. But that don’t make ‘em a majority. And even amongst those who *do* talk and deal with you there’s a goodly number who only love you during the day. But when it gets dark it turns out they are storing arms for the VC, or giving Intell to the Taliban telling ‘em where to plant their next IED, or etc., etc.
You then try to lay the need for us doing as we are in the ME due to “globalization,” which for the life of me I miss. Is there any other country on the face of the entire planet that has *less* to do with globalization than Afghanistan? Burundi maybe?
You then somewhat end by saying:
“By failing to grasp realities, conservatives have abdicated any meaningful role in influencing the developing doctrines and foreign policy behaviors that will shape our role over the course of the next 50 to 100 years.”
I dunno about 50 to 100, but I certainly hope it’s the case for the next few decades at least until they get over their addiction to foreign adventuring. (If they ever do.) Adopting Vietnam, and now this ….
And it seems to me to be an admirable effort at chutzpah to condemn those opposed to the so-called conservative Bush/Republican Party foreign affairs ideas as being “unrealistic.” The entire country just spoke via some elections you may have noticed. And in terms of embracing Mr. Bush’s ideas and legacy the rather roaring sound you heard was the electoral equivalent of a horselaugh. And yet it’s those being *laughed* at (and rejected) who are the clear-eyed realists? Those “realists” who aren’t just gung-ho for *nation*-building, but indeed think we ought to embark on some *civilization*-building and “reforming” of all of Islam?
*They* are the ones with the gimlet eyes?
They don’t even seem to understand their own countrymen much less the millions upon millions of Iraqis and Afghanis they think they can mold.
Cheers
The problem is that the taxpayers will tire of pop-centric COIN long before the Taliban tire of guerilla warfare. A doctrine that requires 60-100,000 US troops and scores of billions of dollars is unlikley to be allowed the time it’s proponents say it needs. An option is to concentrate on building Afghan security forces and conducting DA against tribal leaders who can’t be bribed to hunt AQ & Taliban. This is what probably actually worked in Iraq. Most US troops may not have even been required in country.
MattC86:
Your point that Iraq, Astan, and other counterinsurgencies like Vietnam because “conventional” armies didnt get coin and therfore the delta in experience and training was decisive and produced loss is simply not supported by the historical record. However, the very batch of Coindinistas that you so glowingly shower praise over have built a cottage industry of sorts over the years and have constructed a false reality that it has.
The bloody shirt of lack of coin experience and training briefs well and ostensibly gives you a moral base for your argument, but history does not support it.
My advice to you would be to stop reading Krepinevich on Vietnam and start reading Birtle; and stop reading Ricks on Iraq and start reading On Point II by Don Wright and Tim Reese.
[...] This is not some left-wing tree hugger, Bacevich was a Career Army officer, fought in Vietnam, and had a son die in Iraq. His critiques of the US military might be brutal but those on the inside are paying attention. For example, he was recently invited by the Center for a New American Security, the intellectual strong-hold of the Counter-Insurgency theorists that are playing an influential role in developing President Obama’s new Afghanistan policy, to address their annual conference, knowing that he would disagree with everything they would say. Read an account here. [...]