Orthodoxy And Fundamentalism
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Sullivan quotes Peter Rollins:
Fundamentalism can be understood as a particular way of believing one’s beliefs rather than referring to the actual content of one’s beliefs.
It can be described as holding a belief system is such a way that it mutually excludes all other systems, rejecting other views in direct proportion to how much they differ from one’s own [bold mine-DL]. In contrast, the a/theistic approach can be seen as a form of disbelieving what one believes, or rather, believing IN God while remaining dubious concerning what one believes ABOUT God (a distinction that fundamentalism is unable to maintain). This does not actually contradict the idea of orthodoxy but rather allow us to understand it in a new light…
If we define “fundamentalism” this way, we would necessarily classify all religious systems that have any authoritative doctrinal definitions as fundamentalist. When Judaism teaches that God is one, it doesn’t mean that God can also be many (even though there are names for God that are in a plural form); the most basic belief of monotheism excludes that which flatly contradicts it. (The Church defends the paradox of Trinitarianism on the assumption that God is one, and that the Trinity does not imply many gods.) In other words, every kind of religious orthodoxy would have to be classed as fundamentalist, which makes the term so broad and ahistorical that it’s not clear to me how it even describes something either within or against any traditional religion. With this definition, every form of traditional Christianity would be defined as fundamentalist. Even though Sullivan has usually applied the term fundamentalist far too broadly, I doubt that he really wants to use such an expansive definition.
To state that something is orthodox is to exclude in one way or another those things that disagree with it. The very name orthodoxy, right opinion, implies that there is something wrong or false that it opposes. In one sense, exclusion is the wrong way to think about it, since it is not orthodoxy that is partial, limited or sectarian, but those teachings that mistakenly take one part of orthodoxy for the whole or obsess on one particular formulation to the exclusion of others.
If Christ is the Incarnate Word, He is not merely divine nor merely human; the latter views are necessarily excluded by affirming the central tenet of Christianity. The Resurrection is real, in which case salvation is possible, or it is a metaphor and a nice story and there is no salvation. At some point, even in a revelation that celebrates paradox as the Gospel does, affirming one thing will rule out others. Orthodoxy, and I am speaking now specifically of Orthodox Christianity, does not reject allegory or mystery or unknowing, but includes all of these things, while at the same time being able to engage in positive theology that points towards divine reality in a correct way. God in Himself is incomphrensible, but can be known inasmuch as He has revealed Himself to us, and that knowledge is a reliable guide to understanding something about God. Everyone has personal doubts, but to make a virtue out of doubting, as Rollins seems to do, is to strike at the certain hope that the Gospel offers.
If Rollins were talking about apophaticism here, that would be one thing, but he isn’t. He isn’t saying that definitions are never exhaustive of God’s existence, and that God can never be fully described because He is unknowable in Himself and infinite. (Incidentally, even apophaticism relies on claims that exclude other, contrary claims, i.e., that God is finite, knowable, etc.) Rollins is saying that affirming X and rejecting its contrary in Y is fundamentalist. So now even logic and rationality are fundamentalist. He is also saying that making any authoritative statement about God is fundamentalist. Conceivably, if someone held that he could know God in His essence through rational means (which is the heresy of Eunomios–no relation to this blog), or that a doctrinal definition told us everything about God that there was to know, that person would be a fundamentalist, but then he would also be a heretic. In Rollins’ view, we could not exclude this heresy as contrary to Orthodoxy without becoming fundamentalists, but, in fact, the ability to exclude such views is the way that Orthodoxy remains a living, dynamic tradition and does not become simply a list of claims and rules but remains a vivifying, enlightening experience of the Life of God. Arguably, fundamentalism could be defined as the kind of religion that is satisfied with the bare minimum of definitions and rules and never looks beyond them. But that is also far too sweeping and not really accurate, since there are virtually no people in history, including people who called themselves fundamentalists, who believed in this fashion.
Filed under: Christianity, Orthodoxy, religion
17 Responses to “Orthodoxy And Fundamentalism”
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Daniel,
I think you overreach when you say that Rollin’s definition of fundamentalism applies to all religions. It’s more accurate to say that it might apply to the monotheistic traditions of the Judeo-CHristian-Islamic tradition, however. But even there I have some serious misgivings as to whether it really describes all approaches and all peoples in that tradition.
If we talk about the dangers of religious fundamentalism today, we have to recognize that we are basically talking about the monotheism of the Judeo-Christian-Muslim tradition. Other religions simply don’t have the same problematic forms of exclusive and aggressive fundamentalism – meaning in this context a single claim to truth that invalidates all other truths. Monotheism strictly defined is as you say – an orthodoxy that admits no diversity. But of course the reality in these traditions, including even Orthodox Christianity, is far from homogenous.
The reason for this, of course, is the example of Jesus himself, who clashed with the orthodox Jewish authorities of his day. I’m sure you’re far more conversant in the Eastern Chruches than I am, but I did spend quite some time as a teenager pouring over the mystical traditions of the early Church, including the desert fathers, the neo-platonic traditions of Dionysius the Areopagite and others, the Hesychists, etc. And I found quite a lot of concerns that had little to do with the aspects of Christian teachings that fundamentalists labor over. Yes, the eastern Church has an authoritative structure and insists on certain basic truths. In practice, it seems much looser and more interested in understanding Jesus directly and mystically rather than through doctrine. But maybe I was simply drawn to the eastern teachings that had that bent.
In any case, there’s certainly an argument to be made that much of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic monotheistic tradition is, indeed, fundamentalist. It would explain a lot of the conflicts they’ve had both within their own traditions, with each other, and with outside traditions. It’s only as these traditions have become less monotheistically certain of their own doctrinal supremacy that they have become more human and tolerant of those within and without their various sects who see things differently.
Reducing any tradition to belief in X and therefore rejecting Y is, yes, the form of logic that fundamentalism uses. It’s not the form of logic that Jesus used. He used an inclusive logic that says we must love our enemies, not hate them. This is a logical standard which does not allow us to assume that those who assert different truths than we do are heretics who are categorically wrong. If we must love them, we must also try to understand how they think and why, and see that they are not wrong, but merely, at worst, unable to properly perceive things as they are. Lovihg one’s enemies is an entirely different approach than the fundamentalist approach, or even the approach of those who put doctrine above love. That is why Jesus created the Eleventh Commandment, and why he didn’t bow to the authority of the Pharisees. Their authority was not based on love, but merely on the cold rule of law, and thus it was not alive. Fundamentalism is like that – it relies on cold logic and either/or thinking, not the inclusive, unconditional love that Jesus taught.
Reducing any tradition to belief in X and therefore rejecting Y is, yes, the form of logic that fundamentalism uses. It’s not the form of logic that Jesus used. He used an inclusive logic that says we must love our enemies, not hate them.
Not at all–to say that Jesus used a logic when applied to people and not propositions is to abuse the word logic. Logic, and the principle of non-contradiction, properly applies to propositions. If some religion maintains that x is true, it must reject non-x. Even those that appear to be accomodationist at some level (and thus denying the principle of non-contradiction) will maintain a basic truth that supercedes all others.
Love of enemies is not an act of the intellect (even if it presupposes an act of the intellect), but an act of the will, and thus contradictories are not involved.
To say that law has no place in love is to ignore, for one, the epistles of John, where the relationship between the two is quite prominent. And so it is in the Christian tradition of both East and West.
I was going to say something very similar. The insistence that belief in X (a proposition) entails the rejection of anything that contradicts it is just a matter of logic simpliciter, and not “the form of logic that fundamentalism uses”. Reducing a religious tradition to the assent to a few core beliefs is indeed what fundamentalism has traditionally been understood to be – but it is entirely possible to affirm a body of belief and reject those claims that contradict it without being reductive in this way. I think that this is exactly what Daniel was driving at in his original post, when he claimed e.g. that Orthodoxy is “a vivifying, enlightening experience of the Life of God”, and argued that this is enabled rather than undermined by its doctrinal character.
Conradg: a term like “inclusive logic” strikes me as something akin to terms like “white logic”: it assumes that other forms of logic beyond basic logic exist, which conform to other rules than does basic logic. Unless we intend to change the basic meaning of “logic”, then it seems that Daniel’s point that the basic tenets of logic (like “x is not non-x”) would be fundamentalist under Sullivan’s overly expansive definition.
I’m suggesting that there’s a tradition within Christianity which is about going beyond these exclusive dualisms, both in human relations and in doctrinal logic. Obviously there’s a distinction between logical fundamentalism and interpersonal fundamentalism – it’s just that they tend to go hand in hand. I think it’s also clear that the message of the Gospels is one that places personal relationships far above those of doctrinal logic.
The main feature of fundamentalism, I’d suggest, is exclusion – both in the realm of doctrinal logic and in human relations. The main feature of Jesus’ message is inclusion, both in doctrine and in human relations. Love, in other words. I don’t think reduction of a message to a few essential precepts is, in itself, fundamentalism. Obviously Jesus himself reduced the entire message of the Judaic tradition to a few precepts, such as “God is love”. The question is whether these precepts are treated as exclusive and hostile to the rest of the tradition, and intolerant of other traditions,, or inclusive and openly disposed towards the rest of the tradition, and tolerantly disposed towards other traditions.
In other words, there are forms of religious fundamentalism which are indistinguishable from narcissism.
Jesus main message, as Daniel hints at in his post, was that he was the Way, the Truth, and the Life, and the only way to the Father. In other words, it was exclusive in the formal sense. His first words in the gospels are “Repent, for the Kingdom of God is at hand.” Jesus loved everyone, and his love was inclusive, but he demanded that his disciples follow him alone.
Also, Jesus never said “God is Love”; St. John did. Granted, one can clearly glean this message from Jesus’ life and teachings, but he reduced the Judaic tradition to two actions (“Love the Lord your God” and “Love your neighbor as yourself”), not one precept. And note: the first action is profoundly exclusive. You are to love God with every fiber of your being, and there should be nothing left over for anyone else. The result of loving God is that your love is multiplied to include other people, but first you must exclusively love God.
PhG,
There’s certainly plenty in the Gospels that can be used to justify an exclusive approach. History certainly bears that out. And the history of Christianity has, indeed, ben replete with dogmatic fundamentalists who took these things too far.
But there’s also other interpretations of the Gospels. For example, you interpret “Love the Lord your God…” as being an exclusive precept, but this is only the case if we presume God and man to be utterly separate. The full quote gives an inclusive context: “Love the Lord your God with all your heart, your mind and your body, and your neighbor as yourself.” It doesn’t pose loving God as something exclusive of loving one’s neighbor, or in opposition to that. It is the means whereby we are able to love our neighbor. In fact, it suggests that if you don’t love your neighbor, you’re not loving God properly. As he said of his disciples, “ye will know them by their love”.
Some aspects of the Gospels certainly do support the notion that Christianity is the one and only possible Way or Truth. Thus, there’s fertile ground for fundamenalism there, if that’s the way one is inclined. But it requires that inclination in the first place, and a desire to carry it out on a theological, social, and political level to make it happen. One can’t just blame the scriptures. An open, tolerant, and I would say more genuinely loving approach is possible, in which one interprets such seemingly exclusive statements as meaning that the way of loving God and one’s neighbor as oneself is the only true way. Which is not exclusive of all the many ways one might love God and one’s neighbor – such as a Hindu doing so through his or her religious tradition.
As for loving others, what Jesus literally taught is to “love others as I have loved you”, which means, unconditionally. Loving others means being able to see Divinity in them. One does not love God exclusively, and then love others. One loves God in his totality, which includes his Creation, especially his creation of other human beings like ourselves. His Creation is not separate from Him, such that one could love God exclusive of his Creation, since we are a part of that Creation.
His Creation is not separate from Him, such that one could love God exclusive of his Creation, since we are a part of that Creation.
Yes, but one does not love Creation or neighbor with the same priority that one gives to God, and in this way, love of God is ‘exclusive.’ No creature should be loved as God should be loved.”
It is the means whereby we are able to love our neighbor.
More accurately, God is the reason for loving our neighbor.
Some aspects of the Gospels certainly do support the notion that Christianity is the one and only possible Way or Truth. Thus, there’s fertile ground for fundamenalism there, if that’s the way one is inclined. But it requires that inclination in the first place, and a desire to carry it out on a theological, social, and political level to make it happen. One can’t just blame the scriptures.
I don’t think this is going to carry weight with any non-Protestant Christians here.
. Which is not exclusive of all the many ways one might love God and one’s neighbor – such as a Hindu doing so through his or her religious tradition.
It is exclusive in so far as it is not possible for someone to love God without grace. Does God give grace and enlightenment so that those outside Christianity nonetheless find their fulfillment? Yes. But this is despite any error they may hold without culpability.
tedshan,
I’d agree that one loves God differently than one loves one’s neighbor, even primary, but not that this means love of God is “exclusive”. When we start using words like “exclusive”, I think we are starting down a dangerous road that leads to some very loveless ends. One can’t ignore the terrible examples of this, as when the Churches of all varieties have engaged in pogroms and other anti-semitic campaigns. Likewise with the murderous sectarian strife that has plagued Christendom throughout so much of its history. If such people had placed more emphasis on loving one’s neighbor and loving one’s enemy than on the exclusive claim to truth and God they did emphasize, Christianity would more resemble the teachings of Jesus than the opposite.
tedscan,
“It is exclusive in so far as it is not possible for someone to love God without grace. Does God give grace and enlightenment so that those outside Christianity nonetheless find their fulfillment? Yes. But this is despite any error they may hold without culpability”
The problem here is that once someone has been exposed to Christianity, it’s certainly possible to hold them as culpable for the “error” of not converting. This is how the Jews were held culpable for killing and rejecting Christ. It’s also how the British, say, justified their occupation of India in the name of Christendom. Since most Hindus were exposed to and rejected Christianity, that strain of thought doesn’t let them off the hook. It ignores the ability of people to love others without adhering to Christian beliefs in salvation. It also ignores the ability of others to love God as much as a Christian loves God.
I’m all in favor of Christians loving God, to be sure, and doing it in their own way. But fundamentalism is always a great temptation – in my view, it’s the epitome of temptation – that steers the genuinely religious off the track and into error – regardless of what tradition they belong to. Others may disagree of course.
The problem here is that once someone has been exposed to Christianity, it’s certainly possible to hold them as culpable for the “error†of not converting. This is how the Jews were held culpable for killing and rejecting Christ. I
1. If we are talking about the non-Protestant tradition and not popular misunderstandings, then only the Jewish leadership that demanded his crucifixion are culpable. It doesn’t matter how things have been twisted by antisemites who do not have any teaching authority.
2. Even if a non-Christian can be reckoned with certitude that he has rejected Christ knowingly and voluntarily, human beings have no authority to punish him for that sin, and the demands of particular justice upon Christians still apply (as well as charity), though both may not yield the same precepts as liberalism.
It’s also how the British, say, justified their occupation of India in the name of Christendom. Since most Hindus were exposed to and rejected Christianity, that strain of thought doesn’t let them off the hook.
I’d like to see a reference for this.
tedschan,
Are you unaware that the “white man’s burden” was to spread Christianity to the heathens? Do you need documentation?
Documentation that the British justified their occupation of India as a punishment of the Hindus’ culpable rejection of Christianity.
ted,
I didn’t say they justified colonialism as punishment, but as an effort to “Christianize” these heathen cultures. If I mistakenly gave that impression, I both denouce and reject the notion.
That it would be a punishment is something that can probably be inferred from your premise:
The problem here is that once someone has been exposed to Christianity, it’s certainly possible to hold them as culpable for the “error†of not converting. This is how the Jews were held culpable for killing and rejecting Christ. It’s also how the British, say, justified their occupation of India in the name of Christendom.
You seem to be arguing that the British justified their occupation by arguing that the Hindus were culpable for being ignorant or for rejecting Christianity. Perhaps you can provide support for this.
Otherwise there is no connection between you assertion regarding culpability and the British. (Or perhaps any other historical example.)
ted,
Yeah, I reread my post after replying, and I see where I messed up there. That’s the problem with writing on the fly – thoughts sometimes get mushed together in ways I didn’t intend. I had intended merely to make the point that because the Hindus were not Christians, it justified occupying their country and trying to transform it into a Christian one, not as punishment, but as a “noble cause” – which was part of the rationalization for western colonization everywhere. It’s a related point, but different from the “punishing” theme of anti-semitism.
Sorry for the confusion. Sometimes I have to check what I think I wrote in my own mind from what I actually wrote.