Legitimacy
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James has some interesting thoughts on Austin Bramwell’s TAC review of Heads In The Sand (not online yet, sorry) and his definition of conservatism, which Bramwell has defined in terms of defending the legitimacy of institutions. I may say something about the review at another time, but I want to address the other item first.
If we applied the label institution widely enough to include social and religious institutions, that might take account of part of what conservatism is, but to ground it in a defense of legitimacy without reference to authority or legal or religious tradition seems potentially more “vacuous” than to say that conservatives respect tradition. Dwelling on the obvious limits of this basic statement about tradition, Bramwell is correct when he writes:
A “tradition” is no more than something which is handed down. That which is handed down, however, can be wise or unwise, uplifting or debasing, liberating or constraining.
Yet an institution’s legitimacy is always grounded in some political and legal or, quite often, in a religious tradition. The legitimacy of institutions depends on a tradition, which, as Bramwell says, may be wise or unwise, uplifting or debasing. The Supreme Soviet had de facto legitimacy in its own state and the Soviet government’s institutions were regarded as legitimate, but does that then mean that the men who sought to defend and preserve it were conservatives? In what way does this defense-of-legitimacy definition differ from the utterly unsatisfying “conservatives resist change” thesis, which is another way of saying that conservatives defend the status quo? What is more, if that is what the defense-of-legitimacy thesis means, why would anyone embrace it unless he believes that the status quo is acceptable? In other words, if this is the essence of conservatism, why would anyone find conservatism even remotely worthwhile? Defending the legitimacy of institutions that have none, or have lost it, is not terribly edifying, either, and such a defense seems to take no account of whether such institutions’ legitimacy deserves defending. Are the members of ZANU-PF conservatives? Of course they are not, but under this definition they could readily be considered as such.
We are reluctant to recognise legitimacy in barbaric and totalitarian states on the assumption that they base their rule in a rude appeal to power, rather than authority, and indeed they displace the idea of authority all together. Historically, communist regimes tend to strip away legitimising myths (“power comes from the barrel of a gun”) at the same time that they promote the biggest fantasy of them all, which is that they were, are, workers’ governments. So, properly speaking, such regimes cannot have legitimate institutions that rightfully possess authority, but the legitimacy of those institutions is still defended by those who would maintain the status quo, and particularly those who would maintain the conditions that permit these defenders to hold some considerable power and status. So to speak of legitimacy without discussing authority and usurpation does not get us very far. There is something that must precede any discussion of legitimacy, and this is respect for rightful authority, which implies that authority can be wrongfully claimed and thus illegitimately possessed by a usurper. That, in turn, implies that this legitimate authority has grounding in something other than accident or widespread deference.
Someone who respects a certain tradition will want to defend the legitimacy of the institutions that derive from that tradition in part because the tradition is bound up with this matter of legitimacy. Furthermore, in respecting the tradition it is possible to recognise departures from it or attacks upon it from usurpers. Remarkably, Bramwell’s entire discussion of legitimacy does not consider the problem of usurpation and what the appropriate conservative response to it would be. Usurpers will frame their actions as legitimate and appropriate. Caesar was supposedly a protector of the Republic, and William III was not an invading foreigner aided by traitors, but was the liberating, rightful ruler! Those who believe these fictions and follow the usurpers are not, as far as I can tell, conservative in any sense of the word. They may be very pragmatic, and they will find a place for themselves in the new order, but allies of usurpation cannot be conservatives. If conservatives are concerned with the legitimacy of institutions, there must be some standard against which they can measure whether those institutions have been taken over by those who do not have a legitimate claim to them. One can very easily imagine how this defense-of-legitimacy conservatism could rally around an abusive executive in the name of defending the legitimacy of the Presidency; indeed, this slavish attitude towards the Presidency has been present among a great many self-styled conservatives for a long time. If “respecting tradition” is too vague or vacuous, Bramwell’s alternative seems to me to be potentially quite pernicious.
While Bramwell puts too much weight on a defense of legitimacy as the defining element of conservatism, he similarly undervalues the importance of legitimism within any particular political tradition. For example, he can say about an arch-usurper that he “preserved legitimate government in North America in the only way possible,” which is to say, “he preserved legitimate government in North America” (the poor Canadians don’t count, I suppose) simply by coercion and power and not by any appeal to rightful authority. Curiously, legitimate government was not threatened with extinction–certainly no more so than when the colonies rebelled–so how was Lincoln’s course of action “the only way possible”? Did the Crown lose its legitimacy in the eyes of all its other subjects when it failed to suppress the colonial rebellion? It did not. Then again, if avoidance of war on this continent was the goal, our ancestors certainly should not have rebelled against British rule. Further, it would seem to follow that the Loyalists (and our Canadian neighbours) were, are, the last defenders of legitimate government on this continent, and they managed this without having to kill hundreds of thousands of people. If that was the case, this suggests that legitimate government is more durable and is less in need of mass slaughter to preserve itself than the example of Lincoln would have us believe. Indeed, one might make the limited need for coercion and the lack of violent resistance the proof that a government continues to be accepted, or at least endured, as the legitimate government. Arguably, once it must suppress those it considers to be its people with bloodshed it has not only “lost” legitimacy because of the violence used to suppress its people, but had already lost that legitimacy, which is why there was the need to resort to force to shore up its deteriorating position.
Bramwell also neglects religion or religious authority in sanctioning certain institutions as legitimate. Most states throughout history have claimed that their legitimate authority on earth derives from some divine authority or heavenly mandate, and certainly Christians believe that they are obliged to obey the lawful government, which receives its power from God, and even some modern states still rely on employing religion to bolster their legitimacy. While there are and have been secular conservatives, it is curious that Bramwell makes no mention of the preservation of religious tradition or religious institutions in providing his definition of conservatism. Perhaps he means to include religious institutions in his more general discussion of institutions, but when discussing legitimacy the failure to mention religion in any way seems to be an important oversight.
Filed under: politics
“Further, it would seem to follow that the Loyalists (and our Canadian neighbours) were, are, the last defenders of legitimate government on this continent, and they managed this without having to kill hundreds of thousands of people.”
I don’t mean to be snotty, but isn’t this because they fought, killed a lot of people, but were defeated before they could kill any more?
From the way this sentence is phrased, one might think the British and the Loyalists were quasi-pacifists who gave up the fight in April 1775 or at least no later than July 1776, but as you surely know, that couldn’t be farther from the truth. Obviously the question of when killing the enemy in war becomes “mass slaughter” is subjective, but the several thousand Patriots who were killed in action (and the several thousand more who died of war-related but non-battle deaths) would have been startled to learn that they died at the hands of exceptionally tender-hearted folk.
The British and Loyalists tried their best, lost fair and square on the battlefield, and rightfully gave up. The state of British politics in 1781-1783 is not an aspect of the Revolution in which I have much expertise, but I am not aware of any evidence that guilt over or compassion toward colonial war dead played any role whatsoever in the British decision to make peace. I would be interested to hear if there is any such evidence, however.
If the outcomes of Yorktown and Antietam had been reversed, this whole discussion would be completely different. (Well, obviously if Yorktown had come out differently there would have been no Antietam, but you know what I mean.) The British and Loyalists stopped fighting because they lost, not because they disliked killing the enemy. (And as for Canada, they had killed quite a few people to win control of that area in the first place. The deportation of the Acadians exceeded anything Sherman ever did.) In shot, the myth of the pacifist or tender-hearted Loyalists is, frankly, a rather bizarre assertion on your part.
Who started the war? It wasn’t the Loyalists. They were defending what they considered to be their legitimate government against an illegal uprising. I wasn’t talking about pacifism or tender-heartedness or anything of the kind. I must not have written this part very well if it has been taken in such a weird way. The point is that Bramwell described Lincoln’s methods as the “only possible way” to preserve legitimate government, and this isn’t correct. Yes, the British resisted the rebellion by force, and the Loyalists aided them in doing so, but what I was trying to get at is that the Loyalist position–the abuses of Parliament and the Crown were not worth starting a war–rejected the option of using force to settle colonial disputes with London. Loyalists wanted to avoid war, which is one of the reasons they took the view of the dispute that they did. The patriots believed that the disputes were worth going to war over and forced the issue. Perhaps I shouldn’t have complicated the issue with talking about Loyalists, but Lincoln obviously had alternatives to waging a full-scale war in order to preserve legitimate government.
Great stuff!
Talking about what a conseravtive is in relation to various governments and governemtn qua government is not really productive…
Isn’t engagement with politics a sign that we are not in the presence of “conservatism”?
What is this or that form of government to a conservative? I’d say it’s of no real concern other than the extent to which it fosters, ignores or damages the “culture”(?) in which the conservative lives and wants to preserve…
Daniel: What am I, chopped liver? http://theamericanscene.com/2008/05/19/defining-conservatism-up
Yeah, and I feel, like, so dissed, too.
I’m not the best person to judge conservatism, but in my mind I’ve always equated conservatism with the notion that there are certain primal truths that can’t be changed by human desire or ingenuity, that regardless of what we might wish, we have to accept ourselves, and humanity, and the world, as being governed by these primal truths. Various types of conservatives might disagree about what these primal truths are, hence there are a variety of conservatives in the world who sometimes clash with one another. But in this fundamental sense they are all operating by the same logic and with the same purpose: to preserve these truths, and to ensure that human society is built on their foundation, and to fend off all attacks on these truths, and on the society that reflects them.
Now, this definition can indeed come up against some contradictions. Free-market conservatives try to defend and uphold capitalism against the predations of communists, because they believe that capitalism reflects basic truths about human nature. But there are also communists who could be considered “conservatives” within their own ranks, because they believe fervently that communism reflects the basic truth of human nature. I can understand why such people are considered “conservatives” within the communist world, even though they do not beleive in the same truths that conservative capitalists believe in. So conservatism itself is not merely an ideology, but an ideology based on a certain way of seeing fundamental truths. It is not, in reality, revolutionary, in that it is not trying to destroy old truths. It is trying to destroy what it considers lies that hide the truth.
So I don’t particularly see conservatism as wedded to institutions or traditions for their own sake. Conservatives are only wedded to institutions that serve to preserve and promote these fundamental truths they believe are the basis for a human society. If the institutions depart from that purpose, they lose legitimacy in the eyes of conservatives. If they return to that purpose, they regain legitimacy. Thus, conservatives can lead revolutionary political movements when institutions fundamentally fail to reflect and preserve and promote these basic truths. This is not the same as a liberal-motivated revolution that would seek to create new truths and be done with “old truths”, as if the core truths of life could ever be made obsolete by any superficial changes in the world.
“Who started the war? It wasn’t the Loyalists.”
Well, actually it’s uncertain which side fired the first shot at Lexington, and it’s certain that the fight occurred because the British were planning to seize the colonial militia arms at Concord. Of course, we could go back before that and say Patriot-begun events like the Boston Tea Party were the real “start” of the war. I think either side of the debate can be defended (and one could argue that the same goes for the 1861-1865 war as well).
My point was that if we accept the proposition that wars whose main purpose is merely the preservation of territorial integrity are morally suspect (as you seem to, and as I generally would as well) and that deaths incurred therein are “mass slaughter” morally equivalent to murder (this proposition is more debatable, but I’ll agree that if the war is truly unjust then this is so), a full-throated defense of the Loyalists becomes more difficult (not impossible) to make.
Mr. Kabala, I’ve done some editing for the sake of clarity–
If we accept the proposition that wars whose main purpose is merely the preservation of territorial integrity are morally suspect and that deaths incurred therein are “mass slaughter†morally equivalent to murder
then
a full-throated defense of the Loyalists becomes more difficult (not impossible) to make.
I don’t see how it follows, or how the consequent is related to the antecedent. Are you maintaining the Loyalists were fighting a war to maintain territorial integrity? I assume that by “territorial” you also mean more than just geography but the political and constitutional arrangement as well.
Even if either side can be defended, there should be some standard which a judgment as to the rightness and justice of a side can be ultimately be judged. I don’t think it is merely Lincoln was wrong, therefore the Loyalists were wrong, or the Loyalists were right, therefore Lincoln was right as well.
And if “territorial” includes political and constitutional, Lincoln was not waging war for this purpose, even if he thought so in his mind. If territorial integrity is just about the possession of land, then the Loyalists were not doing this but were defending something more than that.