Maliki
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Andy McCarthy offers this reminder:
As I’ve mentioned before, Maliki, of the Shiite Dawa Party which opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq in the first place, has long-standing ties to Iran and Syria — and has expressed support for Hezbollah. The only thing that surprises me about this story is that anyone is surprised.
McCarthy is entirely right in what he says here, but that raises a couple questions. First, there is the obvious question of why the U.S. is attempting to pursue a strategy premised on limiting Iranian influence in Iraq and the region while actively backing a government that has no intention of limiting Iranian influence in Iraq and very clearly is led by a sectarian party. Then there is the question of whether McCain understands any of this when his rejected NYT op-ed states quite clearly that he does not consider Maliki and his government to be sectarian.
According to the version on Drudge, McCain wrote:
Nor do they [progress benchmarks] measure Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s new-found willingness to crack down on Shiite extremists in Basra and Sadr City—actions that have done much to dispel suspicions of sectarianism.
Leaving aside that Maliki’s actions regarding Basra and Sadr City were part of intra-Shi’ite feuding in the name of establishing the authority of the central government, this statement by McCain shows that he does not understand the nature of the Iraqi government. (Maliki’s targeting of other Shi’ite groups obviously would not in itself imply non-sectarianism, but would only prove that he wants his faction of Shi’ites to be dominant within the Shi’ite majority.) Even more than creating a political problem for McCain back home, Maliki’s recent statements have revealed both the untenability of a continued U.S. presence in Iraq and the complete incoherence of U.S. strategy in that country.
Filed under: Islam, foreign policy, politics
It’s too simple to assume that an Iraqi, simple because he’s a Shi’ite, is necessarily an Iranian puppet. There’s no love lost between Arabs and Persians.
More likely Maliki is playing a balancing game between the Americans and the Iranians. Indeed, that’s the most plausible diplomatic compromise–an Iraqi state that’s friendly enough to Iran not to threaten another war, but independent enough to reassure the Americans and Iraq’s other neighbors.
These things are doable, and indeed, may well have been discussed between Americans and Iranians in secret talks.
The big threat is the maniacal desire on the part of a few for a criminal and very likely disastrous air assault on Iran. The Podhoretzes of the world are becoming increasingly deranged (1938! New Holocause! World War IV!). I’d like to hear more voices gainsaying these fools and knaves.
Obama con I ain’t, but I pray that BHO really is a closet moderate when it comes to aggression by bomb. I fear that McCain, an ex-flyboy, would be less restrained.
But it is not so strange to assume that a member of the Dawa party is an Iranian puppet, or at least quite pro-Iranian as he has been for decades. It is far less true to say that of Sadr, who has typically waved the banner of Iraqi nationalism to set himself up as an opposition figure and whose father broke with Dawa long ago, which is why efforts by Maliki’s forces to quash Sadrite power are even more worrisome *if* the goal is contain Iranian power. Of course, if the goal were to contain Iranian power, you wouldn’t depose the Baathist who contained Iranian power. That’s the real point here–to believe that U.S. strategy can succeed in Iraq, you have to believe that Maliki is not pro-Iranian and is non-sectarian, when neither of these things is really true.
In my view, however, containing Iranian power went out the window once Hussein was toppled and a majoritarian Shi’ite government was established, which makes even the intended objective hard to reach no matter what. There is no love lost between Arabs and Persians, very generally speaking, but there’s not necessarily the same strong antipathy between them that there used to be in the 1980s.
I take your point. Are there any Iraqi forces, though, that support vilayet-e-faqih, the rule of the clerics, as in Iran?
It still seems to me that the situation could evolve into an analog the post-Vietnam-War situation, where the party the powerful neighbor supported decides it prefers its national identity and independence to subservience to foreigners.
Subtlety is required. I understand we are fresh out.
Doesn’t Sadr spend his days as a guest of Iran? That doesn’t speak for his independence.
And didn’t Maliki welcome the Sunnis back into his government this week? That doesn’t support the sectarian-pawn-of-Iran model either, does it?
Looking at Maliki’s actions, it’s hard to see anything but someone trying to ensure his own political future by at once exerting the necessary monopoly of force that any government requires, while demonstrating his independence from not only the US, but also Iran.
I’d have to say that “containing Iran” has never been a primary goal of our strategy. It’s on the list somewhere, but our actions have too-often deviated from the optimal course that primacy would entail.