A Fateful Underestimation
Posted on August 8th, 2008
by Daniel Larison |
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Mr Saakashvili, who took office in 2004 promising to restore Georgian rule over South Ossetia, appeared to have misjudged Moscow’s resolve, perhaps calculating that Vladimir Putin would not dare to respond militarily while he was in Beijing for the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games. ~The Times
The situation in Georgia is tragic and terrible, and I hope that hostilities will cease as quickly as they began. Even so, there is some small satisfaction in seeing this lackey Saakashvili have his comeuppance. To have demonstrated so clearly and unequivocally that democratization is not a substitute for good government, the “color” revolutions are a sham and NATO expansion is dangerous and foolish in one day is something good that has come out of this. It is something that may help Westerners to avoid making the same enthusiastic mistakes of the past. If this conflict helps to drive home that recognizing Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence was a major blunder with grave consequences for other parts of the world, it may not have been entirely destructive.
Filed under: Russia, foreign policy, politics
But how will it drive home to those that subscribe to these terrible ideas that these ideas are in fact terrible? It can’t be the indisputable proof that expanding Pax Americana through democratization has been a miserable failure.
If it were merely a question of proof, there would not be any constituency to speak for a militarized democracy. Instead, I think its best to take a realistic look (which is indeed pessimistic) and assess this from the perspective of the neo-imperialist in a democrat’s clothing. Their ideology can never fail; it can only be failed by proponents or thwarted by its enemies.
It very much reminds me of the communists who argued that communism was never really tried. As I recall, tens of millions of people died before it was decided that was a bad idea. And that only happened in large part because the victor gets to write the history.
This is too optimistic by half, I fear.
The noise about “Russian aggression”, “Russian empire”, “Czar Putin” and “violating the
sacredOlympic Games” will cover up this (very strong) signal. My bet is that, by next week, very few will remember that Saakashvili was the one who started this fight.Though I am no Saakashvili fan, my sentiments tend to run directly opposite. If Saakashvili can be said to have started the fight, it is only in the capacity of his reckless policies vis a vis S. Ossetia and Abkhazia over the past 4 years. Meanwhile, the provinces, with Moscow’s backing, have pretty much turned down every initiative for peace when proffered by Saakashvili, inconsistent though they may have been. The current fighting was certainly initiated by the S. Ossetians.
And Moscow has shown the complete vacuousness of its advocacy for territorial integrity in the Kosovo business by violating Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Not that the fig leaf that it has kept up over the past decade has fooled anyone.
While I certainly hope the violence stops as soon as possible, the best case scenario I see is Russia getting humiliated in some way or another before it all ends. If they want another Afghanistan, let them have it.
It depends on what we mean by “the current fighting.” If we’re tracking it back all the way to the 1990s, then I guess the Ossetians are ultimately responsible for breaking away. The current fight, meaning the raid on Tshkinvali, was started by the Georgians. There has been skirmishing for years during the time of Saakashvili’s reckless policies and there have been exchanges of drones across the frontier in recent months, but the raid yesterday was a direct result of those reckless policies. How Saakashvili escapes taking the bulk of the blame here is not clear. He turned low-level skirmishing into a war.
Of course the Ossetians have rebuffed all efforts at negotiations at Moscow’s behest. Georgia does not get to flirt with NATO and receive favors from Moscow at the same time. If the priority was to reintegrate these territories, deliberately charting an anti-Russian course in every other area of foreign policy was the most foolish way to try to do it. Saakashvili wanted to have it all–a pro-Western tilt and an irredentist agenda. Now, in trying to have both, he will have neither.
Russia has been effectively violating Georgian sovereignty for over 16 years–there was never any question of their having a thoroughly consistent position on respecting state sovereignty. The only question was whether it would take the de facto control it had and use it to create new “independent” states under its tutelage in retaliation for Kosovo. After Kosovo independence, it was just a matter of time before Georgia lost these provinces for good, and Saakashvili gave Moscow the perfect pretext for doing this.
Having the Russians humiliated in a war they did not start is not a best-case scenario for anyone. It prolongs the war, probably intensifies it to the detriment of Georgians and Ossetians and might ultimately destabilize the whole northern Caucasus by making Russia appear unusually weak. There is no question of “another Afghanistan,” or even another Chechnya, unless Saakashvili is as stubborn as he is stupid. Regardless, the costs will largely be borne by Georgia, which is a strange way to humiliate the Russians. Why would we want Russia to be humiliated? Do we want to foster anti-Georgian resentment and discrimination there? That is what Georgia humiliating Russia would accomplish. Well, that and a continued blockading of the country and the impoverishment of the region. The best-case scenario is that Saakashvili calls back his forces, negotiates a cease-fire and then resigns in disgrace while the Security Council gets Russia to agree to Georgia’s continued independence. Ideally Russia would also agree to facilitate humanitarian relief and a restoration of full economic ties.
[...] Obama and Bush, right-ish; McCain, dead wrong Obama, Bush, and McCain all offer statements in response to the “three a.m.” emergency in the Caucasus. Daniel Larison, expert on all things Russian, offers extensive, erudite commentary. [...]