It is particularly annoying when someone who is as knowledgeable about Russia as Anne Applebaum undoubtedly is resorts to the crudest, most inaccurate generalizations:

Russia, by contrast, is an unpredictable power, which makes a response more difficult. In fact, Russian politics have now become so utterly opaque that it is not easy to say why this particular “frozen” conflict has escalated right now.

Ah, yes, the wildly unpredictable Russians, who have so “unpredictably” responded negatively to NATO establishing missile defense sites in central Europe, NATO expansion up to their borders, open Western interference in the internal politics of their neighbors and the partition of Serbia.  Who can possibly know why they act as they do?  It can’t be as simple as looking at Russia’s interests as defined by the Russian government and recognizing that our policies conflict with those interests–Russian politics is so opaque!  When in doubt, I suppose one can always fall back on the patronizing riddle-wrapped-in-an-enigma stereotype.   

Russia has scarcely done anything in the last decade that could not have been predicted, and most of what Russia has done in response to U.S. policies in recent years was predicted by some of us in the form of warnings not to do the things Washington was doing.  For her part, Secretary Rice has often expressed puzzlement about the public statements by Putin and others critical of U.S. policy, which suggests that she knows the real reasons for the worsening relations with Moscow but prefers not to admit that Washington has contributed significantly to the decline in relations or she is genuinely clueless about the government of the one country in the world about which she is supposedly a top expert.  

The conflict escalated right now because Saakashvili followed through on his promises to establish Tbilisi’s control over South Ossetia and found that (surprise!) a contingent of armed Russians was still there, just as they have been for over a decade.  He had made feints towards South Ossetia in the past, but always drew back from the brink of sustained conflict, and believed that he had his chance while the world was preoccupied with the Beijing Games.  This is not a mystery.  The situation was made demonstrably worse earlier in the year with the recognition of independent Kosovo, which all but guaranteed that Russia would make a play to shore up the Ossetian and Abkhaz statelets.  I wish my column and posts on Kosovo recognition had been entirely wrong, but at least concerning the Georgian situation I am sorry to say that they were not.  The situation was further exacerbated by the promise of future NATO membership to Georgia, which probably encouraged Saakashvili to think that he had the West’s implicit backing for his agenda to assert control over the breakaway regions. 

Applebaum’s column is unfortunately another example in a long line of Western commentators who support all of the things that anger and provoke the Russians and then express shock and bewilderment that the Russians have become angry and lashed out in some way.  More worryingly, I fear that, in the minds of these observers, there is a complete disconnect of what is now happening in South Ossetia from NATO expansion, Kosovo independence or any of the other points of contention with Russia.  In many cases, though perhaps not in Applebaum’s, Western observers confess to not understanding why these things are happening because they are studying it as a purely isolated phenomenon in which U.S. and Western actions seem to have no part and for which none of us has any responsibility.  Unfortunately, just like Russian reactions to perceived international challenges, Western commentary on Russia is so very predictable. 

Also, it is not reassuring when Applebaum keeps referring to it as “the Caucuses.”  The people in the Caucasus aren’t in Iowa, and they’re definitely not voting. 

Update: Via James, I see that Saakashvili continues to be predictably ridiculous by issuing this declaration:

If the whole world does not stop Russia today, then Russian tanks will be able to reach any other European capital.

It would be easy to laugh this off as mere absurd posturing, except that the one who is saying it is the Georgian President and responsible for the start of a war.  The most frustrating thing about all of this is that his apologists in the West are going to ignore his role in precipitating this conflict, or absolve him of all responsibility if they do acknowledge his role, and will blame the conflict on a “lack of Western resolve” rather than the irredentist fantasies of Saakashvili.  On the radio this afternoon Medved was going on about the “threat” of Russian nationalism, which seems to be less of a threat to the people in South Ossetia than Georgian nationalism and no threat to the rest of us. 

Second Update: My Takimag colleagues Richard Spencer and Chris Roach have good posts on the conflict.

Third Update: They’re getting into the predictable warmongering spirit over at Commentary, complete with warnings of Russian expansionism that might have come from Saakashvili’s press office.

Filed under: Russia, foreign policy, politics