Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgia’s President, might have been profoundly unwise to employ massive force against the pro-Russian separatists in South Ossetia last Thursday, but his poor judgement is not the point. The commanders of Russian forces and their political masters in the Kremlin hoped he would behave exactly as he did. ~James Sherr

So when one side in a conflict does something that is profoundly unwise that leads to a dramatic escalation of violence that has already killed thousands of people, it’s beside the point?  That the Russians hoped Saakashvili would do something monumentally stupid, reckless and dangerous does not relieve him of the responsibility for doing it.  When you consider that war with Russia was almost certain to result from his decision and that the outcome of any conflict with Russia was always going to be very bad for his country, Saakashvili’s profound lack of wisdom seems to me to be at the heart of the issue.  You can argue that this is not what matters most at the moment, since the blunder has been committed and cannot be undone, but if we are going to judge Saakashvili’s actions I don’t see how his disastrous blunder can be dismissed so easily.  Embarking on a course that likely meant war with a vastly superior force in a fight he had no hope of winning was a deeply unjust thing to do.  Having been entrusted with high office to protect the interests of his country and people, he betrayed that trust with a horrible decision. 

Do the Russians bear some responsibility for setting the trap that Saakashvili so stupidly walked into?  I suppose they do.  Of course, they are responsible for any excesses they have committed or will commit, and given their overwhelming superiority their campaign ought to judged according to strict standards.  The attacks on Georgian infrastructure and the use of indiscriminate shelling and bombing are wrong and unnecessary.  While I am tempted to ridicule people in our government who have now discovered the importance of proportionality in warfare, since they have never before shown much concern for this principle before now, it is an essential principle that allows us to distinguish between legitimate and excessive uses of force.  Clearly, the war against Lebanon was a disproportionate response, and Russia is in danger of engaging in the same overkill that made the original, limited Israeli retaliation in 2006 go from enjoying broad international support to being almost universally condemned.  Will the Russians advance past Gori and attack the capital?  If they do, they will quickly find themselves with few defenders around the world.

Update: The Russians have reportedly bombed the Tbilisi airport.  I am still not persuaded that Russia intends to annex Georgia, but Moscow does seem to have decided on inflicting total defeat on the Georgians and presumably ousting Saakashvili in the process.  This would be an excessive response.  Just as it was no defense of Georgia’s actions to say that the Russians were goading Saakashvili into lashing out, it will be no defense of Russia’s excesses to say that Georgia escalated the conflict.  Moscow should accept the cease-fire proposal and halt its offensive, or its war in Georgia will start to push indifferent and even sympathetic nations into opposition.  Unfortunately, Moscow is probably more interested in its own kind of “demonstration effect” by making an example of Georgia. 

Update: Somewhat related, I agree entirely with Thomas de Waal, who argues that this was an entirely avoidable conflict and says it is outrageous that Russia is now bombing Georgian towns and villages.  That is why Russia should halt its offensive now and respond to the Georgian offer to negotiate.  His column on this is as balanced as any I’ve seen since the war started.

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