But the August war in Georgia and the ongoing economic and financial collapse mark a tipping point. For the first time in generations, a mood of patriotism, jingoism and staunch Russian nationalism have become pervasive among even educated Russians who once considered themselves pro-Western liberals. Yes, most Russians have been reflexively patriotic all along. But Russia has seldom in living memory been more nationalistic—and seldom have Russia’s brightest and best found themselves more in agreement with the people—as well as the Kremlin—on their country’s greatness. In the spring of 2008, 65 percent of Russians felt “generally positive” about the United States, according to the Yuri Levada opinion polls center in Moscow. But after the war in Georgia, that indicator dropped to just 7 percent. At the same time, Putin’s approval ratings have climbed eight points between July and September to 88 percent; Dmitry Medvedev’s increased 13 points, to 83 percent. ~Newsweek

That surge in hostility towards the United States is remarkable, but not at all surprising.  We cannot as a matter of official policy and establishment consensus opinion vilify Russia for years and then treat Russia as the villain in what is at best a very murky, complicated conflict and expect there to be no consequences.  Throughout Russian history, when Russia has faced an external challenge it has worked to the advantage of the state, as memories of past conflicts are mapped onto new ones and there is a strong nationalist impulse to solidarity with the state in response to the challenge.  This is a common theme in nationalist politics, but it is strongest among nations that have both old and recent memories of foreign invasions.  What I have continued to find so frustrating and perplexing about Western expressions of antipathy for Russia’s legitimate interests is the complete lack of comprehension of the political reaction this real and perceived hostility would cause inside Russia.  After each provocation, Russian nationalism grows stronger, Putinism becomes more entrenched and U.S.-Russian relations keep deteriorating, and then Westerners complain about Russia “turning away from the West”–how can Westerners not see their own part in this dynamic? 

If Russia is becoming increasingly nationalistic, and is now more so than at any time since the end of the Cold War, it is no small part because Westerners have spent the better part of the last twenty years making demands, acting provocatively and ignoring Russian interests.  If liberal forces have been completely routed and authoritarianism advances, it is at least in part because Putin and Medvedev offer the Russian public a means for political expression of their frustrations and interests and these figures can plausibly portray liberals as excessively pro-Western and their Western sympathizers as pretty clearly anti-Russian.  If the interests of Russians and their ability to live in a freer society are the concer, why continue to play into the hands of authoritarian populists and the forces of nationalism by adopting ever-more confrontational and anti-Russian positions?  When a foreign government berates and vilifies America, or even just criticizes our government, most Americans take a dim view of that foreign government regardless of whether the criticism has merit and regardless of their own political views.  Why would we expect Russians to be any different?  When the founder of Yabloko and other members of the liberal opposition are siding with the modern Kremlin, Western sympathizers with Russian liberalism–who are also typically advocates of democracy promotion and NATO expansion–have done something wrong.  Even though this may ultimately be for the best in weakening the association between Russian liberals and the West, clearly any “freedom agenda” Washington wants to promote has gone badly awry when the last Russian liberals want nothing to do with the West.  For my part, I think that internal Russian affairs are the business of Russians, and America’s concern should be to pursue as much cooperation with the Russians as our just interests allow, but it seems inescapable that if you are interested in promoting liberalization inside Russia there could not be a more counterproductive approach than the current method of threaten-and-insult.  

Attending a Russian church, I know many Russians and Russian-Americans, and there is complete unanimity from everything I have heard from my friends that Russia is the aggrieved party in this conflict, Saakashvili is a war criminal and the American politicians who have paid court to him are appalling.  Electorally, this means opposition to McCain, who is rightly considered the worst of the lot.  There seems to be universal disgust with the news coverage of the war in Georgia.  As the results from the survey cited in the article show, clearly this is not simply a function of members of the diaspora taking a harder line than people in the home country as is sometimes the case with diasporan communities.

Filed under: Russia, foreign policy, politics