A Depressing Dose Of Reality
Posted on November 21st, 2008
by Daniel Larison |
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American presidential elections are often best read as verdicts on the administrations that precede them, and in that light, Barack Obama’s victory on November 5 marks the long-overdue death of neoconservatism. ~David Donadio
As our editor Scott McConnell would say, they only look dead, and strangely these days they don’t look very dead at all. Conor calls for sober assessments on the right concening foreign policy, so I am here to offer a sober reality check to the many people who probably think, or very much want to believe, that Mr. Donadio’s reading of the election results is correct. I want to be clear: few things would please me more than for this claim to be true, but we must look at how things are and not merely at how we would like them to be. Should neoconservatism, particularly with respect to foreign policy, be absolutely discredited, dead and buried? Certainly. In the last thirty to thirty-five years, scarcely any other American political persuasion, to use their preferred term, has been more wrong about more things in foreign policy debate. But the reality that something should be ruined does not mean that it is. The same might be said of any number of false understandings of man, society or international relations, yet these ideas live on long after their opponents assume that they simply had to vanish, partly because they continue to find patrons and institutional support and partly because any given ideology is designed to blind its adherents to the consequences of their ideas. Ideology serves to tell its adherents why it is always different this time, why the examples of the past do not reveal that they will fail, and why their cause, unlike all the other armed doctrines, will win…eventually.
There is a powerful belief that I think most people have that failure of a policy endorsed by certain ideologues ought to so undermine an ideology that it cannot survive, except perhaps as a shrinking remnant, but this forgets that ideology often is, as Prof. Bacevich put it so well, a highly elastic rationale for action. Its utility comes from its adaptability and its ability to endure setback after setback; it must present a worldview that is compelling enough that people wish to follow it long after its failures have become obvious, and it survives only so long as it keeps providing that rationale for action. Because ideology is abstract and necessarily unbalanced in its understanding of the world (ideology being at its core the excessive emphasis on one truth or half-truth to the point of absurdity), failures are inevitable. Successful ideologies are those that can incorporate and explain away those failures in terms of a long struggle for lofty ideals or imperfect execution by half-hearted followers. If the “ideology of national security” that Bacevich identifies in The Limits of Power is concerned primarily with legitimizing the exercise of executive power, neoconservatism is similar in that it seeks to legitimize the aggressive use of American power and, to the very large extent that this entails aggrandizing the executive, it dovetails with the “ideology of national security” that is much more broadly shared in the political class.
Bacevich makes an important point about the postwar U.S. “power elite” and foreign policy that helps us to understand why neoconservatism is not going to disappear:
Yet from the late 1940s to the present day, members of the power elite have shown an almost pathological tendency to misinterpret reality and inflate threats. The advisers to whom imperial presidents have turned for counsel have specialized not in cool judgment but in frenzied overreaction. Although the hawks have not always prevailed…more often than not the proponents of action, whether advocating direct intervention, relying on covert means, or working through proxies, have carried the day. The hawks may not always advocate immediate war per se, but they lean forward in the saddle, keeping sabers drawn and at the ready. The mantra of the hawks is the barely veiled threat: “All options remain on the table.”
The ideology of national security underwrites a bipartisan consensus that since World War II has lent to foreign policy a remarkable consistency. While it does not prevent criticism of particular policies or policy makers, it robs any debate over policy of real substance.
Clearly, neoconservatives, who are among the most forward-leaning of these forward-leaning members of the elite, are suited to thrive in this environment, because they specialize in threat-inflation, saber-rattling and calls to action, action, action. Another thing that ideology has going for it is its simplicity. The idea that America is essentially blameless, a force for good and must project its power to secure liberty for all is both emotionally powerful and readily digestible. The false, progressive nationalist historiography of the United States helps to make this message more resonant, which is one reason why neoconservatives remain so wedded to this view of American history. Precursorism, anachronism and cherry-picked evidence are their favorite instruments. In the official story, America expands, moves from strength to strength and its increase in power has meant an increase in freedom for all, which both justifies and demands continuing the pursuit of more power. Neoconservatives are not alone in being willing to oblige, but they are among the most eager.
There is an idea, which seems to have gained some currency in the country as a whole, that the financial crisis and our economic woes will force the government to scrap the empire and give up on hegemony. I am increasingly of the view that something much closer to the opposite will be true. The conventional, and typically wrongheaded, interpretation of the interwar period has been that global economic calamity not only helped to create totalitarian menaces, but they also undermined Western efforts to thwart them, and I fear this is going to be applied to the present to agitate for an even more interventionist and aggressive posture abroad.
We are not, God willing, entering into a period of similar dislocation and upheaval. Even so, you can guarantee that the alarmists who warned of new Hitlers every other week in the booming ’90s and were constantly warning against “existential threats” during the last decade will be, if it is humanly possible, even more inclined to declare emergencies and demand action–and I fear the public will be inclined to listen to them, because a people is never as susceptible to a message of national superiority and self-righteousness as it is when times are bad, and neoconservatism indulges both sentiments. The moment when reflection and renovation are needed is often the moment when men turn instead to ready-made ideas that flatter and reassure them. A time of crisis is often the least likely time for self-criticism and reform. We may have seen the end of preventive war for now, and aggressive democracy promotion may recede into the background for a while, but the basic conviction that American power should advance and defend American ideals–as I think neoconservatives would euphemistically describe their own vision of the American role in the world–is going to continue to motivate a large part of the right. This is why, perversely, even though the experience of the Bush Era should make conservatives more inclined to heed non-interventionist and realist counsel, I fear that most conservatives are going to oppose the Obama administration by adopting even more hawkish positions than he does and criticize him for his lack of resolve, and the neoconservatives will be there urging them on.
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12 Responses to “A Depressing Dose Of Reality”
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The neocons need patronage. Not for them crying in the wilderness, living on locusts and honey, fasting and praying. Rubber chicken is so much more tasty than those locusts.
Predictably, with Rumsfeld out and Cheney on his way out, they’re cozying up to Hillary and suddenly finding Obama to be less of a Bolshie than he seemed just weeks ago, something we figured out early on.
Kristol and JPod may not land jobs with the new administration, but no doubt they have cousins whom they reckon up by dozens who can fill the bill, not to say uncles and aunts. One advantage they have is that so much of the antiwar left seems completely unhinged.
For the Bush-tainted, as long as their paymasters keep afloat in the panic, think-tank-land ain’t such a bad place.
“I fear the public will be inclined to listen to them, because a people is never as susceptible to a message of national superiority and self-righteousness as it is when times are bad, and neoconservatism indulges both sentiments.”
I know the very word “hope” initiates the gag reflex in you, but isn’t Obama’s election itself a sign that this fearful reaction to bad economic times does not always sway the electorate? We hear endless complaints from Republicans that McCain had no chance to win once the economic crisis hit, but shouldn’t it have been just the opposite? Shouldn’t people be more susceptable to the neocon message during a time of dismal economic crises, as you say? Well, this time at least they are not. Maybe things haven’t been bad enough long enough, but Obama’s election itself suggests that these truisms about fear can often be negated by the more positive aspects of our souls, which desire something less base than fearful aggression for an answer.
It appears to me that the current drive to hang the blame for Bush’s failures on the religious right is part of the neocon strategy. As I’ve said elsewhere, this is like the pigs in Orwell’s Animal Farm blaming the sheep.
Good post.
But what you describe in your final graf - that’s the recipe for national decline, isn’t it? Which is, I fear, our destiny - maybe particularly for the reasons you cite. Americans on the whole seem not only unwilling but incapable of redefining their nation’s role in the world; incapable of being the “normal nation” that Jeanne Kirkpatrick once counseled.
For now, though, the economic argument against more foreign interventionism is strong. Indeed, it would have been an extraordinarily sharp cudgel for Obama to wield in the debates with McCain; given our national economic meltdown, how wise is it for this nation to be spending $10 billion a month in Iraq? But Obama always went light on that argument, leading me to believe he won’t necessarily see things that differently from McCain. The military-industrial maw needs to be fed, after all.
There are things worth hoping for, but baseless, groundless “hope” isn’t really hope at all. I think Obama was able to win in no small part because he offered the public a message of American exceptionalism *and* addressing the economic concerns of voters. Militarism and exceptionalism by themselves aren’t going to win an election during poor economic times, but if things get worse I fear they will become much more powerful. Of course, when this case is made it is going to be clothed in the language of optimism–”Americans can do anything!”, “there are no limits to what we can achieve,” etc.
You’re missing the more important point, which is that part of the power of Americanism is that it recasts what you and I would call “fearful aggression” as something high-minded, generous of spirit and good. If you frame it as a series of new wars, that isn’t going to be terribly popular; if you frame it as renewing American leadership in the world (that sounds familiar somehow), how many people are going to say no? These ideas survive and thrive because their proponents speak in an optimistic tone and describe their terrible proposals as a vindication of the American spirit and so forth. Maybe this is proof of their political savvy, since there seem to be few votes in gravely warning against foolish policies, but that proves my larger point–they are not going away, and their ability to return to power is far greater than many seem to think.
Thankfully, you’re not the guy who gets to determine what is “baseless and groundless”. People will do that based on their actual lives, and how Obama’s administration addresses their problems.
But that isn’t the point you were making. You were claiming, with some historical precedent, that people are more susceptical to the whole “Americanism”, neocon, demagogic “country first” national-greatness line, especially when things are going badly. You based endless pessimistic posts throughout the campaign on this premise, constantly predicting that Obama will succumb to Republican smears about his lack of “Americaness”, that the demagogic campaign tactics of the past would work, especially against Obama. You were wrong. You were spectacularly wrong. I thought you might have been humbled by your own failures as a prognosticator, but now here you are trying to ressurrect the same failed analysis, as if the election never happened, and if it turned out differently than you thought, it must be for some other, magical reason, and not because your own thinking about these things was wrong. Well, I suggest you do some critical self-examination to see where exactly you got it wrong, and not be so kind with yourself by pretending you didn’t make remarkably bad errors in judgment that reflect on your basic assumptions about the electorate, and Obama himself. Better that you adjust your calibrations now, I think, rather than continue to make the same dreadfully obvious errors over the next four years.
I underestimated Obama’s ability to counteract the smears with his own advocacy for American exceptionalism and can-do optimism. That is true. In general, I underestimated his abilities as a campaigner and politician. I was wrong in making specific claims about how the electorate would react to Obama. That is not what I’m talking about here, and that should already be obvious. It is actually you who are making rather grand claims about what Obama’s election means for the electorate’s susceptibility to fearmongering and militarism.
I am saying that neoconservatives are going to be able to thrive in bad economic times, in part because they will be able to appeal to the public with their American national greatness rhetoric, which gives people a way to feel as if they are compensating for economic weakness. At some point, this becomes untenable in terms of resources, but we are probably a long way from that yet. Immediately, they will thrive and survive within the GOP on this basis, and then they would be positioned to capitalize on any discontent with Obama. That doesn’t mean that they will win against Obama, but it means that they are not dead or anywhere near it.
Obviously, there are many factors, most of which we don’t know yet, that will affect particular outcomes of elections in the future, and I’m not concerned with that here. Contrary to your out-of-the-blue complaint, I have learned my lesson on that score. The point is that there are obvious structural reasons why a future GOP challenger or future GOP administration will still be heavily reliant on neoconservatives. Note that at no point in the original post or in my earlier response did I say that a neoconservative candidate would be able to defeat Obama at the polls. One of the reasons I think they failed this time and why they may fail in the future, as I was trying to say before in my first response, is that Obama effectively neutralizes most of their usual anti-Democratic attacks with his own interventionist and exceptionalist tendencies. For all the reasons you mention, I try to avoid making electoral predictions, especially this far in advance. I am saying that neoconservatives will continue to be a real force, and I am giving the reasons why I think this is so. You have made your point about my misreading of the electorate this year, and obviously I read things all wrong with respect to the presidential race, but I am talking about an entirely different subject here.
For that matter, who is going to stop neoconservatives or replace them inside the GOP?
Daniel, I won’t argue that neo-conservatives will continue to have some sway within the GOP, although their inability to sway anyone outside the GOP has been noted even by the GOP, which I think is why the GOP is shifting more towards the cultural and social issues. McCain was primarily the neocon candidate, and he failed miserably. His form of American exceptionalism is of the old-school. If you want to place Obama within the general fold of “American exceptionalism”, which I think is a stretch given the usual parameters of that category, and the fact that McCain ran against him primarily on the grounds that Obama did NOT represent American exceptionalism properly, even there, you have no particular reason to expect Obama to represent the kind of American exceptionalism that neocons like McCain promote. Obama ran on a very different, highly liberal, non-aggressive but diplomatically friendly kind of American “leadership” in the world, that explicitly rejects the kind of crap that led to the Iraq invasion. Now certainly he’s not a paleocon, I will grant that, so he’s not going to satisfy you, but the notion that his election victory is some kind of affirmation of the conventional form of American exceptionalism the neocons represent is just absurd.
And getting to the main point here, the notion that neocons will be able to exploit tough times to promote their agenda simply doesn’t hold up in this election cycle. I’m not making grand claims about the end of history here, but I will say this has meaning, and the meaning is generally good - that the electorate is not fooled by that same gaming anymore. They are wising up to some degree, and are rejecting the neocon two-step. It’s all a little too transparent by now. You can certainly claim that the hope they place in Obama is “baseless and groundless”, but I think not. If Obama has even a reasonably succesful four years, with the economy coming out of its problems within two years - which I think is pretty likely - people will generally feel that their hopes have been well-founded, and will re-elect him. One great advantage in coming in at this time is that the bar is so low - the economy is teetering on the verge of a great depression, and Bush is the least respected President in the last century. Neocons will certainly agitate and foam at the mouth, as is only to be expected, but I have a hard time seeing anyone but a faction of the GOP biting. Really, you have a lot to thank Bush and Cheney for, in that I think they have destroyed not just the reputation of the neocons for a whole generation, but their ability to make convincing appeals to our emotional weaknesses. This is the best aspect of the last election, I think. Mr. I-Can-Win-Wars was dealt a death blow, and I don’t think you’ll see another GOP candidate run that kind of campaign for a long time. Not unless something utterly devastating occurs on the international scene - and even then, I think America will want to sit out any conflicts that don’t direct impinge upon us.
“who is going to stop neoconservatives or replace them inside the GOP?”
Having failed to elect the neocon McCain, I think the next round is going to go to a social conservative. Maybe Huckabee, maybe Romney. I’m not sure it matters, in that the GOP will likely lose, unless Obama screws up badly. In eight years, God knows what they will have come up with, but it better be something new, or they have no chance whatsoever. I don’t think any genuine “new values” GOP candidate will appear by then, but you never know. Jindal may be their best hope, but I’m not sure he’ll pan out, in that he’s smart and capable as a technocrat, but I’m not sure his political talents are up there. What the GOP really needs is for Jindal and Huckabee to get gay married and produce some devil’s spawn. That would be a formidable candidate.
“In the last thirty to thirty-five years, scarcely any other American political persuasion, to use their preferred term, has been more wrong about more things in foreign policy debate.”
Since 1978 or 1973?
It must be marvellous to be so unequivocal about things, so categorical in your judgements, so confident that forming your ideas into words and sentences and longish paragraphs will lead to the truth without considering the details and counterarguments.
People who aren’t so cocksure about their own opinions may wonder if the neocons of the 1970s and 1980s might have been right about more things than the McGovernites or Carterites of the day were.
I might wonder that, if I had much reason for it or if someone could present an argument to that effect. Speaking of *foreign policy*, which I was, you would probably have a hard time persuading me that they were right about more things than the McGovernites and Carterites of their day over the last 30 years. I did qualify the statement (”scarcely any other…”), not that you care to pay attention to such things.
These were the people who typically opposed detente (they were wrong!) and vastly exaggerated the durability and power of the USSR (wrong again!). I’m reasonably sure that neoconservatives tended to support the deployment to Lebanon–they were wrong again. They then continued after the Cold War being wrong about almost everything that mattered. Had I limited my point to the last 25 years, would your objection have any validity at all?
Rushing to Daniel’s defense, I really would like to know how the neocons were more right than McGovern or Carter. Do you mean McGovern was wrong about Vietnam, or that Carter was wrong to put missles in Europe? Not that I’m big fans of either, but in retrospect they certainly were no more wrong about most big issues than the neocons.
The controversy over the Tomahawk and Pershing missiles occurred during the Reagan presidency. If Carter did decide to put missiles in Europe it would only have been after the failure of his initial hopes for detente. In any case, it doesn’t look like he managed to do so.
The neocons of the Seventies and early Eighties were right about some very important things, including foreign policy — more right than their opponents. Some of them did overestimate Soviet strength, but their opponents also exaggerated the stability and permanence of the Soviet empire. Ronald Reagan, who the neoconservatives supported for President, didn’t believe in the durability of the Soviet system and was ridiculed for his naivete.
When it comes to the later Eighties and early Nineties, one’s verdict on the neocons depends on what evidence one considers: stray articles in Commentary, or the policies of the administrations the neocons supported. In those days, politicians didn’t act on everything ideologues said and ideologues didn’t expect them to, so I’d have to say that the achievements of those years outweigh whatever silly or wrongheaded or vile things Norman Podhoretz wrote or published.
An end to the Cold War, liberty for Eastern Europe and the Soviet states, an opening to resolve long-standing international conflicts: those weren’t all just the gift of Gorbachev. And they weren’t something foreign policy realists would have achieved on their own. We needed realists to counsel moderation in situations where prudence was neeeded. We also needed someone to urge resolve and negotiation from strength and no provide ideological underpinnings for our actions. The neocons made their contribution in those areas.
Of course there were mistakes. Maybe we didn’t have to go so deeply into debt, or support Islamic fundamentalists, or stumble into Iran-Contra. Any course of action involves errors and miscalculations — would an alternate approach have achieved as much as we in fact did? Was the world really worse in 1992 than it was in 1979?
The record of the neocons since then has been quite bleak. So much changed with the fall of the USSR — overconfidence and triumphalism became so pronounced — that it may not even make sense to speak of a neoconservative “record” stretching back “30 or 35 years.” But later failures don’t diminish the successes of the first generation neocons. They would have recognized the ideology you describe as a caricature, and assumed that such oversimplifications reflected some ingenuousness in your own outlook.
Of course, I notice that in politics, once you define someone as the “enemy” or the “adversary” it’s almost impossible to credit their real achievements. I’m not sure anything’s gained by attributing universal human or political faults to this or that specific group, but one could go further and say that paleocons and libertarians are almost never fair to those whose accomplishments involve greater use of government power. The assumption is that lack of government efforts would virtually always achieve a better result, but that’s a very questionable supposition.