Conceding Too Much
Posted on December 8th, 2008
by Daniel Larison |
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John Schwenkler and John Cole both responded to my earlier post on the call for social and religious conservatives to use reason, rather than appeals to religious teaching, in public arguments. Schwenkler is correct when he writes:
Indeed, I would say that conservatives have if anything devoted too much time to the task of “proving” things like the immorality of abortion (or the existence of God, though that’s a topic for another post) to the satisfaction of their secular peers – where exactly observers like Parker, Cole, and the rest have gotten the impression that things are otherwise is something of a mystery to me.
Many of Parker’s critics have made this point, stressing how typical reliance on reason and empirical evidence is in pro-life arguments. I alluded to this when I noted that it was not the kind of argument employed that mattered to those put off by social conservative views, but the conclusion at the end of the argument, and when I mentioned many pro-lifers’ preference to frame things in terms of rights and equality (hence their fairly frequent comparisons of their own cause to past progressive emancipation and civil rights movements, as if they hope that this will win them bonus points from bien-pensant people). In the past, Ross and I have gone back and forth over whether it made sense for pro-lifers to use philosophical language that already conceded basic claims of individual autonomy. If I recall correctly, Ross did not think this ideal, but regarded it as an unavoidable necessity if pro-lifers were going to be able to make their case to others. At the very least, we would not have been having such an argument if this had not been prevalent in pro-life arguments for some time, so Parker was railing against something that is far more rare than she supposed (if she gave much thought to the matter at all). There are some, including myself and John Schwenkler, who think more forthrightly religious arguments are more compelling, because they concede fewer important assumptions, but we are decidedly not representative (as usual).
There are a few reasons why there is a perception, or rather misperception, that appeals to religious teachings are commonplace in social conservative arguments, and therefore a self-imposed limitation on social conservative ability to persuade others. There is the tendency for people outside of a group to miss distinctions among members of that group that are both obvious and significant to those inside it. It is true that one can find, perhaps among Theonomists or staunch believers in the “Christian nation” reading of American law, direct appeals to Scripture in their arguments on public policy, but these are not representative of social conservatives generally. Among the loudest critics of impending “theocracy,” finding marginal views on the Christian right and then conflating them with the views of all Christian or, more broadly, social conservatives are common methods used to try to link all forms of social conservatism with far more intensely religious and specifically Christian arguments. What an outsider will dub the “narcissism of small differences” does not usually appear small or trivial to those inside the group. There is another tendency, closely related to the first, to lump together everyone who claims membership in that group and make sweeping statements about what “they” do. These are common habits, I’m sure I have fallen into them on many occasions, and we all tend to make such generalizations more sweeping the less we understand (or care about) the diversity within another group. Obviously, the less sympathetic someone is to the group in question, the more likely he is to make sweeping statements that cast the group in whatever he regards to be the worst light. It can also be appealing to frame opponents as being more radically different from the “mainstream” than they really are in the hopes that persuadable people (i.e., those usually paying less attention) will come closer to your side.
The preference for arguments that do not appeal to religious teachings or Scripture is based in the social conservative version of the “defensive crouch,” which recognizes the resistance to these appeals and instead tries to debate on the terms set by opponents. There is a similar move among some non-interventionists, who will critique the war in Iraq by conceding broader claims about U.S. hegemony or the official demonization of other regimes for the sake of appealing to a broader audience. While this can be useful in showing how the war has worsened things on the terms of its proponents, it is fundamentally weaker than a full-throated critique of the illegality and injustice of the invasion or a straightforward argument that the war has significantly worsened our national security, and it is not particularly more likely to persuade anyone. For instance, it is correct to argue that our invasion of Iraq has greatly strengthened Iran’s influence in the region, and one might think that this would make many of the most vocal supporters reconsider the wisdom of the war when it leads to what they must, and theoretically do, regard as a bad outcome. However, this is not what happens.
Even if they acknowledge that Iran’s influence has grown significantly as a direct result of the war, and even assuming that they always regarded Iran as the greater threat, these supporters will insist that the U.S. presence in Iraq must continue in order…to contain Iranian influence! After all, even non-interventionists think that expanding Iranian influence is undesirable, so how can they want us to leave now? All that this sort of argument will have done is to help legitimize the next round of demonization, sanctions and military action, and meanwhile it undermines arguments against a long-term U.S. presence by granting that the containment of Iran ought to be a high priority, but it might well be considered more “reasonable” and more likely to persuade because of its weakness. By pulling off a clever maneuver that temporarily succeeds but ultimately plays into the strategy of the opponent, larger objectives are abandoned and even the temporary success gained from the maneuver vanishes.
Likewise, having conceded the centrality of individual autonomy with appeals to rights theories, pro-lifers are no more likely to persuade those on the pro-choice side, as they have already admitted the fundamental assumption that pro-choicers use to defend their position as the morally superior one. Once pro-lifers have allowed the debate to be defined in terms of choice vs. coercion, or the individual vs. oppressive society, winning over people, especially those in the “persuadable” middle, will become harder, not easier.
Filed under: politics
Determining whether you’ve conceded too much requires a baseline against which to measure your position.
The law is what it is: Casey prohibits states from imposing an undue burden. As a matter of practice, the ease with which abortions can be obtained varies dramatically from state to state, but I have seen virtually no data on the number of women carrying to term in (say) South Dakota who would have preferred to have an abortion.
Against that baseline, what is it you’re trying to achieve? Legal changes, such as a federal Constitutional amendment establishing personhood at conception, or more favorable Supreme Court jurisprudence? Social changes, such that women will choose not to obtain abortions? Or something else?
I think you’re missing a very simple and fundamental point. One of the most important consequences of the rise of democratic enlightenment values has been the discrediting of all forms of “argumentum ad verecundiam”, or appeals to authority. “Because X said so” or “because it’s in book Y” are no longer respectable forms of justification. Religions (especially those based on holy texts or hierarchies) are obviously vulnerable to such a trend, but other institutions are equally at risk. Conservatives cannot afford to reflexively place themselves on one side of this argument, or they will be seen as anti-rational and anti-democratic. But then….
“having conceded the centrality of individual autonomy”
and
“whether it made sense for pro-lifers to use philosophical language that already conceded basic claims of individual autonomy”
both imply, in slightly different ways, that individual autonomy is not a Christian value … or perhaps only that it is not the central Christian value.
In the political realm, I’m wondering what value is more central than respect for individual autonomy, from a Christian perspective. Obviously in a purely introspective / prayerful sense, individual autonomy is subservient to the power/majesty/goodness of the deity. But taking that sort of concern into the political realm seems like a very bad idea indeed.
I’m trying to recall enough of my Aquinas and/or Augustine to guess what you might be thinking of as a more basic foundation of Christian political thought. I’m looking for something that would both be true to the Christian tradition and yet also reasonable considering American traditions of disestablishment and enlightenment.
Or is the point that (properly understood) Christians, as such, are always at war with America (properly understood)? A permanent “Christ against Culture” paradigm?
“Do not violate the integrity of other persons; they are children of God and made in His image” seems like a pretty reasonable statement of basic Christian principle to me, at least in the political realm. Something like that principle seems to underlie the universal condemnation of torture, war, the death penalty, etc. Then the abortion question becomes whether and when a fetus counts as a person. Whether we have common ground as to answers on that question, at least we have reasonable common ground as to the question(s).
Don’t we? What am I missing?
I definitely recognize the “defensive crouch.” Good term.
I entirely agree that the pro-life movement has been very ill served by basing it primary argument on rights. A large part of the problem is that most modern Christians (and not just nominal Christians, but sincere Christians who consider themselves conservatives) are actually good little Enlightenment liberals with a few principled exceptions that the plain teaching of the Bible won’t allow them to abandon. Gay marriage for example.
What is needed is a re-illiberalization of Christianity. That the dominant paradigm is liberalism is evidenced by the fact that your liberal (in the modern sense) posters can’t even conceive of anything else. They take it for granted.
kent, does the Bible say anything about individual autonomy in the political realm? (Autonomy is a broad topic with an array of meanings so I don’t want to over generalize.) In the same way that liberalism is taken for granted today, it was equally off the radar screen when the Bible was written. To attempt to apply modern concepts to the Bible and find justifications there for them is fraught with difficulty.
“What is needed is a re-illiberalization of Christianity.” Along the same lines that the present Pope is following? Complaining about too much education that causes people to question the authority of the church? That kind of thing?
Just curious…
Did the Abolitionists win or not when slavery was ended? And there are several ways of using reason. The high philosophical debates (I think of Buckley with a group of the pro, and another of the Con in a 2 hour PBS special on whatever and I think this is the core).
“Uncle Tom’s Cabin” was a very well reasoned argument against slavery.
But some things argue themselves. Blessed Theresa of Calcutta by herself argued against all manner of evil, and she did so rarely by uttering a word. John Paul II was probably one of the great philosophers of last century but his life itself was a better argument for the things he believed in.
And finally (has it been so long, or are people’s memories so short), what is attractive about Ron Paul if not his humility? He doesn’t engage in verbal sword play, or delve into deep libertarian minutiae. The child who can see the emperor is naked would likely be a better emperor.
People are rational creatures, but they are emotional creatures too. Even Mortimer Adler recognized this when he said there were three steps to presenting an argument (I forgot one, but the other two were logos and pathos). The first step is “why should I care”? It is reason but with a strong dose of emotion as it must be personal. Then “why should I listen to you?” – why are you an expert and actually know something and not just selling something or a charlatan? After getting over these, then present your argument.
The problem with “the bible thumpers” is they are more like Jimmy Swaggart (who wouldn’t even recognize the authority of his own church to discipline him when he was caught) and less like Blessed Theresa.
Shame is perhaps the most powerful argument, but few are those who can credibly argue it.
“There are some, including myself and John Schwenkler, who think more forthrightly religious arguments are more compelling, because they concede fewer important assumptions, but we are decidedly not representative (as usual).”
More compelling to whom? They’re more compelling to you, since you accept all the premises. In any case, it is unclear what conceding assumptions has (in general) to do with how compelling an argument is. Perhaps you and John do not know any good pro-life arguments that do not make use of revealed premises, but they do exist.
“having conceded the centrality of individual autonomy with appeals to rights theories, pro-lifers are no more likely to persuade those on the pro-choice side, as they have already admitted the fundamental assumption that pro-choicers use to defend their position as the morally superior one. Once pro-lifers have allowed the debate to be defined in terms of choice vs. coercion, or the individual vs. oppressive society, winning over people, especially those in the “persuadable†middle, will become harder, not easier.”
With all due respect, this is absurd. The idea that there is something like a right to choose that is relevant to the abortion debate is simply non-sense: no one thinks that a woman has the right to choose to do things with her body that violate other people’s rights. And one can give (relatively) compelling and convincing arguments that unborn human beings are things that have rights, including the right to life. I know both of these things from experience. The people that are difficult to convince are not the people who believe in rights but the utilitarians and the relativists. The reason pro-lifers lose debates is more often than not their ignorance of the best “secular” arguments in favor of their position, not because the best secular arguments are bad ones.