Proportionality and Deterrence (Again)
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Now there is a new Israeli military doctrine: go nuts. The Israeli commentator Ofer Shelah put it more elegantly: ‘In the face of enemies who have opted for a strategy of attrition and attacking from a distance, Israel will present itself as a “crazy country”, the kind that will respond (albeit after a great deal of time) in a massive and unfettered assault, with no proportion to the amount of casualties it has endured.’ ~Paul Wood
One of the reasons why I keep coming back to the war in Lebanon two years ago is that, even more than the operations themselves, all of the arguments supporting the operation in Gaza are the same as they were in support of the campaign in Lebanon. In both cases the idea of proportionality in warfare has received a fair amount of abuse. According to Hanson, it is a “phoney” doctrine, and James Robbins all but dismisses it as irrelevant. Those are among the most extreme examples, but their sentiments are quite typical. This is revealing and important, and it repeats the pattern we saw in 2006. Faced with the possibility that there are Israeli actions in Gaza that actually are excessive and disproportionate, this element of just war theory is simply scrapped or dismissed as inappropriate to asymmetric warfare by defenders of those actions. As I remarked in 2006, “Quickly vanishing is the trope of Israel’s tremendous restraint. The new idea is the virtue of her disproportionate violence.” Something very similar is happening again.
In the same post two years ago, I argued that proportionality and deterrence were linked in an important way:
If every incident, no matter how small, results in a large-scale response, there is nothing–short of their physical annihilation (which may or may not be achievable)–to keep those whom you are trying to deter from making ever larger and more destructive attacks. They will attempt to do the maximum of damage before the inevitable large-scale response comes. The more disproportionate the response now, the less restrained an enemy will be by deterrence in the future. If a string of border incidents over several years, capped off by the kidnapping of two soldiers, leads to waves of air strikes and a ground invasion, it is not hard to see that Hizbullah or its successors will initiate hostilities next time on a much more destructive scale. The disproportionality of response seems effective in pummeling your adversary this time, but it is only truly effective as a deterrent to others if the adversary is wiped out or permanently disarmed (an objective that would currently require an even more disproportionate response than Israel has so far employed).
Anyone who claims that Israel is restoring its ability to deter attacks with its current campaign has misjudged things badly.
Filed under: foreign policy, politics
7 Responses to “Proportionality and Deterrence (Again)”
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Deterrence might be better served through actual rocket-deterrence technology. I know some is in the works–why pursue this overwhelming attack when a possible “Star Wars” like solution is no longer a pipe dream?
That’s why, after reading a great deal on this attack, I simply don’t believe it is anything more than a show of strength for the upcoming elections. It grieves me on so many levels to see it, because I want badly for Israel to succeed, and I don’t think it will ever happen on the bodies of dead Palestinian children. If my daughter were killed in an Israeli strike, how would I feel? How would I react? How on earth would this lead me toward my own peace with Israel?
Of course, as an American I am afforded the luxury of watching all of this from the sidelines, so attempting empathy is tricky, but necessary I think.
hello Daniel!
I have enjoyed reading your thoughts on this topic which I know is an extremely painful one for both of us. Just a couple of comments:
–are people over here forgetting that there are over 100,000 American armed services personnel in Iraq, and that every ton of bombs dropped by Israel (and the aftermath filmed by al-Jazeera for tv) makes their job that much more dangerous??
–in light of the above, WHY ON EARTH is Israel so bloody oblivious to the idea that along with the “privileges” of being considered as an ally of America, there might come certain “responsibilities”–i.e., to avoid setting the entire eastern Mediterranean on fire and then sticking us with the tab??
–has anyone stopped to consider that there are way, way, WAY more people killed in Israel each year from traffic accidents, domestic violence and organized crime, but this barely causes a raised eyebrow, in comparison to the mass hysteria that greets a missile plopping down in a farmer’s field, sent by a population that is being driven towards Zimbabwe levels of poverty??
Take care, Daniel, and let’s hope that this year turns out better than we expect.
It’s a nice thought.
But you are again ignoring the circumstances that led to the present assault. Hamas came to power in elections held two years ago. The past twenty-four months have been filled with precisely the kind of provocations that do not merit an overwhelming response. In fact, in June of last year, Hamas and Israel managed to agree on a ceasefire. And the uneasy peace held, despite mounting evidence that Hamas was using the interregnum to upgrade its arsenal, train its fighters, and improve its position. Moreover, sporadic rocket and mortar fire continued – and by no means all of it was by rogue groups. Some other groups received tacit support from Hamas, and some of the attacks were carried out at the direction of Hamas leaders.
What sparked the present crisis was the discovery, by Israel, that Hamas had been using the ceasefire to dig a 250-meter tunnel from Gaza toward an Israeli outpost, in order kill to capture additional Israeli soldiers. Over the week prior to the discovery, 48 rockets and 21 mortar shells were fired from Gaza into Israel; the truce had been foundering, anyway. An exchange of fire ensued – Israel attacked the tunnelers, and Hamas responded by firing Qassams. Attacks from Gaza escalated over the next two months; Israel often didn’t respond, and generally confined its counterattacks to strikes on the launch areas.
So that’s two years worth of direct proportionality. It’s not as if the first rocket strike precipitated an invasion. No, quite the opposite. The problem Israel encountered was that measured responses were producing absolutely no observable deterrent effect. Nor, for that matter, was its ace in the hole – the threat of reinvasion, of the use of overwhelming force.
If your logic held, one would not have expected Hamas to push this hard. To have crossed the red lines, announced by Israel, of striking Ashkelon or Ashdod. To have allowed the fragile ceasefire to expire. To resume rocket attacks in its wake.
All of that suggests that this is not a case of Israel responding at the drop of a hat. It took two years, Larison. You may disagree with the decision to invade, but then, you don’t live in a part of the world in which deterrence has any meaning. When you and I go to sleep at night, we don’t worry that Canada is going to invade if they think we’re weak. Or that the drug cartels in Mexico may lob mortar shells at us, launch cross-border raids, or abduct random border agents or civilians. It’s not our reality; it allows us to indulge in the fantasy that the threat of force is always more effective than the use of force. Well, it often is. But not always. And when it has proven manifestly ineffective, it’s time to give something else a try.
Actually, Observer, your analogy is not great.
If any of you Americans even THINK of coming over to Canada and kicking up HALF of the trouble that the Israelis have caused in Gaza and elsewhere, well–I’ve got news for you.
It may take decades, it may take everything we’ve got, but we’ll fight back, and we’ll get you.
Watching the Americans is one of the national sports in Canada, especially for the generation that saw the Vietnam war on tv during their childhood. We don’t have very many illusions about you.
Just so you know.
In fact, in June of last year, Hamas and Israel managed to agree on a ceasefire. And the uneasy peace held, despite mounting evidence that Hamas was using the interregnum to upgrade its arsenal, train its fighters, and improve its position.
Observer, you failed to mention Israel’s intentions at the beginning of the ceasefire. But you are correct that this is not a case of Israel responding at the drop of a hat. They were probably planning this six months ago:
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1050426.html
“Sources in the defense establishment said Defense Minister Ehud Barak instructed the Israel Defense Forces to prepare for the operation over six months ago, even as Israel was beginning to negotiate a ceasefire agreement with Hamas. According to the sources, Barak maintained that although the lull would allow Hamas to prepare for a showdown with Israel, the Israeli army needed time to prepare, as well. Barak gave orders to carry out a comprehensive intelligence-gathering drive which sought to map out Hamas’ security infrastructure, along with that of other militant organizations operating in the Strip.”
Justin,
The IDF is an army. I can assure you that there is no organized military force on the face of this earth which does not constantly plan for war. America has war plans, constantly updated, for a wide array of nations, including many with which we are formally allied. It’s what armies do. And, when a nation initiates a ceasefire with an armed group whose avowed intent is the destruction of that state, isn’t gathering intelligence and planning for conflict entirely prudent? Can you imagine the scandal if the ceasefire had expired, Hamas had resumed its rocketfire, and it had been revealed that the IDF had not done a whit of planning or intelligence gathering over the preceding six months?
None of which, of course, meant that conflict was foreordained. Had the ceasefire been renewed by Hamas, Israel would have found itself forced to go along. That’s why, when this operation was first proposed back in November, Olmert demurred. He didn’t want to be the one to break the ceasefire.
The difference, of course, is that Hamas went well beyond planning. It smuggled in weapons and procured training in direct contravention of international law, upgrading its capabilities in a manner guaranteed to undermine the fragile status quo. that, coupled with its decision not to renew, is how this conflict broke out.
Well, at least you now admit that Israel was planning for this operation six months ago. However, it appears we disagree on it being simply routine planning in the abstract for a war that might not ever occur. Israel and Hamas both knew the ceasefire would end and that they were far from reaching any peaceful resolution.