Taking A Hard Line
Posted on January 4th, 2009
by Daniel Larison |
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Via John Schwenkler, Peter Hitchens makes an argument very similar to the one John and I have been making over the last few days. The core moral judgement of the conflict seems very similar:
Terrorist attacks on Israel are indeed revolting and indefensible. But the bombing of densely populated areas, however accurate, is certain to cause the deaths of many innocents.
How then can it be defended? In what important way is it different from Arab murders of Israeli women and children?
One is directly deliberate. The other is accidental but unavoidable. I wouldn’t say that was a specially important distinction, especially if you are a victim of it.
This is rather more remarkable because, as he did in his opposition to the war in Iraq, he has taken this position “as a consistent hard-line supporter of the Jewish state.” Mr. Hitchens is not alone in being a pro-Israel “hard-liner” opposed from the beginning to the invasion of Iraq and the strikes in Gaza, but his combination of views is still fairly rare in Britain and almost unheard of in the United States.
It does prompt me to wonder what exactly is required to be a “consistent hard-line supporter of the Jewish state” when one (correctly!) rejects the policies espoused by most other hard-line supporters. This does not seem to me to be as difficult to pin down as defining who is and is not a conservative. Provided that one does not start with policy positions and work backward, conservatives might acknowledge that their persuasion allows for at least some areas of disagreement on public policy. To be a self-described “consistent hard-line supporter” of a particular state is even more specific than saying that one is a strong supporter, because the label hard-liner implies that there are other, genuine supporters who are nonetheless soft, naive, wobbly, squishy and so forth.
Hard-line usually implies not only a certain temperamental implacability and refusal to compromise, but it often also refers to the perceived severity of policies being supported. Consequently, hard-liner is rarely a name that one self-applies; it is more often used pejoratively and dismissively in the same way that people use the words extremist, fringe or theocrat. Even though Mr. Hitchens uses it here to drive home that he believes the Gaza operation to be so foolish that even he, the hard-liner, opposes it, it is all the more strange to see label used here. He is making clear in his argument that he is not, in fact, consistently hard-line, but happens to agree with the position that is also held by “the usual anti-Israel factions and their gullible supporters,” which opens up the possibility that at least some of the “anti-Israel factions” and “gullible supporters,” so called, may not necessarily be so blinkered and confused as previously thought. (It is hard to tell, as it is not entirely clear who is to be included among “the usual anti-Israel factions.”)
This is a good thing, but it then prompts other questions: if someone as “hard-line” pro-Israel as Hitchens is opposing and even criticizing the strikes in Gaza in terms that are virtually indistinguishable from, say, my criticisms, what separates the pro-Israel hard-liner from the person who criticizes Israeli government actions because they are wrong and because they are manifestly counter-productive and injurious to Israeli security? People would laugh if I were to describe myself in the same way that Hitchens does, but in reality how do we actually differ on policy?
This is not, I think, merely a matter of semantics, but gets at a deeper problem with how we discuss public policy. We could consider the same problem with the troubling use of adjectives pro- and anti-American. Obviously, there are some people who are genuinely, utterly anti-American as such, just as there really are people who are consciously, vehemently anti-Israel, but just as “pro-Israel” has gradually narrowed in meaning until it is difficult to distinguish from maximally hawkish policy views “anti-American” has come to mean any serious or thorough criticism of the exercise of U.S. power no matter its source or expression. Even though opposing hegemony and unnecessary foreign wars is eminently patriotic, we are all too familiar with critics of hegemony and unnecessary foreign wars being accused of hating their country and wishing it ill.
Filed under: foreign policy, politics
Do you think that Mr. Hitchens believes in the conflict-of-civilizations hypothesis? Do you believe in it? I realize that my hero Pat Buchanan does not believe in it. However, I do.
I expect you rhetorically to shred me for pointing it out (you’ve done it to me in these columns before, with impeccable style; I tell you, it isn’t pleasant for the shredded). Nonetheless, I do not see what is so hard to understand about the fact that rules of engagement that spare schools, hospitals, places of worship, civilian crowds and the like fundamentally depend on the military enemy to choose, as a matter of policy, not to take shelter in such places. Yet Arab Muslims habitually pursue the opposite policy.
If I were an Arab Muslim, I might pursue the opposite policy, too. But I’m not. As an American Catholic, my sympathies lie firmly on the Israelis’ side and, despite Mr. Hitchens’ protests, I do not know exactly what we expect the Israelis to do but more or less what they are now doing.
Wes Pruden is exactly right, in my view. If you don’t agree, well, may I ask, why not? Or maybe the only answer is what you’ve already written; but, if so, in this case I find it hard to agree.
Well, I butchered the HTML in that last comment, didn’t I? They runaway hyperlink is still worth following, though.
I guess I just would never call myself a “hardline” supporter of any country other than my own; the kind of support for the peace and prosperity of other nations that I think people mean to apply with the term being, in my estimation, a simple matter of elementary human rights, and not dependent on fidelity to any particular national body at all. My hardline support of my own country, meanwhile, requires the corollary that I don’t at all confuse supporting my country with refraining from harshly criticizing its policies, when appropriate. In fact, real hardline support often means doing just that.
Is Israel doing anything all that different than what Yugoslavia under Milosevic did to the KLA?
Storing munitions and military hardware in civilian areas is a war crime, precisely because it invites military strikes from one’s opponent that will likely kill civilians. Likewise with stationing military personel in civilian areas. The bottom line is that it is Hamas who is committing the war crimes here by using civilian shields for their military operations and personel. Why is there no worldwide outrage over these war crimes violations by Hamas? Why is there no outcry over their policy of provoking military strikes against their military which will ensure that their own civilians die in the process? This is no accident. Hamas is pursuing a deliberate policy of provoked martyrdom. One can certainly criticize Israel for going along with this and responding to the provocations with “excessive” military force, but since that is exactly what Hamas has intended, it’s hard to see it sympathetically. The civilians being killed are dying from Israeli bombs, but the responsibility lies with Hamas for the war crime of using these people as human shields. If Hamas had separate military bases far from civilian areas, as Israel and every other legitimate government does, civilians would not be caught in the crossfire.
As for Hitchens, I’ve never thought he was a hardline supporter of Israel. He used to be very critical of Israel. It’s only since 9/11 that Hitchens has supported Israel, because of his newly awakened fight against Islamic fundamentalism. But his instincts have always been anti-Israeli, so this is nothing new.
Conradg,
If Hamas had “separate military bases far from civilian areas”, those bases would be bombed out of existence by Israel as soon as their presence became known. Given that fact and the geography of the Gaza strip, for Hamas to restrict its military to such bases is not a rational expectation.
Hamas is the government in Gaza and many of Israel’s attacks have been against police stations, the interior ministry, and other buildings that one might reasonably expect to be in civilian areas. See this:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7811386.stm
for a discussion of this general issue.
I know this is slightly off topic, but a lot of your case against certain types of American involvement in foreign conflicts goes back to the Kosovo war. Can you recommend what you consider to be an honest accounting of what went down in that war? I’ve read some here and there, but they all start from the assumption of justified Western intervention. Thanks.
“Hard line supporter” – an interesting topic of discussion all on its own. I take it to mean unreflective and totally partisan. So someone who says they are a hard line supporter is someone who admits that facts, ethics and law have little or no bearing on their position with respect to certain issues. That certainly describes much of the pro-Israel faction here in the US. It also describes a fair number Americans wrt to our own country.
I often wonder, just who or what is being supported? Does supporting your country mean supporting the actions current leadership might take without regard to the rightness or wrongness of those actions? I don’t think it does. Clearly, I hold a minority position in that regard.
Flexible ethics is probably a pre-requisite for hard liner-ism. Maybe more accurately it could be described as a lack of any ethics at all. That is, whatever whoever is in power says is good, IS good. That seems like toadyism to me.
So there we have it – hard liner = toady.
Then again, thinking for yourself has never been a common trait among human beings.
Regarding Kosovo, I can recommend Bacevich’s American Empire, which gives what I think is an honest and reasonably fair accounting of events leading up to and during the Rambouillet conference and the air campaign. His concern in the book is to discuss the campaign in the context of U.S. diplomacy and military policy, but even though he talks about it briefly I think he covers it well. For more detail and commentary, I would recommend back issues of Chronicles from 1998 through at least mid-1999 and particularly the columns of Dr. Trifkovic. The latter are very critical of intervention, of course, but their accounts are honest and fair.
On the comparison with the campaign against the KLA, there are two fairly important differences. The JNA was engaged in a very low-level counter-insurgency using ground forces in mostly rural and lightly-populated areas. In principle, both operations were attempts to protect their citizens against criminal thugs, but given the geography of the province and the nature of the conflict Yugoslav forces were not bombarding or attacking civilian population centers. The other is that Kosovo was an integral part of a sovereign Yugoslavia at the time, while Gaza is not part of Israel’s territory (even if it is often treated as such).
Looked at another way, of course, if the minimal operation Yugoslavia was carrying out in Kosovo actually merited a two and half month air war by NATO, Israel’s much larger operation ought to merit an even stronger reaction, but then I don’t think the war in Kosovo had any justification. It’s remarkable how so many of the backers of the current campaign favored that war–just imagine how they would complain if someone suggested that a campaign to strike against terrorists should be dubbed “genocide.” Perhaps they might then rethink their previous support for bombing the Serbs.
“If Hamas had “separate military bases far from civilian areasâ€, those bases would be bombed out of existence by Israel as soon as their presence became known. Given that fact and the geography of the Gaza strip, for Hamas to restrict its military to such bases is not a rational expectation.”
What you are saying is that, given Hamas’ woeful military capabilities, their decision to commit war crimes and use their own civilians as human shields is completely justified. Likewise, you are saying that turning their own civilian police force into an arm of their military is also justified.
Is this really rational or just? Isn’t the rational and just response, when at such an utter military disadvantage, to pursue one’s ends by other means? But instead, Hamas continues to pursue a military strategy of deliberate civilian martyrdom by provocation. Their “military” has no hope whatsoever of actually destroying the State of Israel. So why pursue military means at all? It is a crime against their own humanity to do so. Why not pursue a peaceful solution that takes advantage of Israel’s notion of social justice to achieve a better life for its people, and a peaceful co-existence with its far more powerful neighbor? It’s not as if Israel is dedicated to the destruction of any Palestinian State in Gaza, but only to one that is devoted to the destruction of Israel.
ny sense to compare this situation with Kosovo or Bosnia.
Even Egypt and the West Bank Palestinian government recognizes that Hamas is nuts. One hopes the people of Gaza will come to a similar conclusion from this debacle.
I also find it odd that Daniel would support Russia’s action against Georgia’s provocations, while condemning Israel’s response to Hamas. Didn’t the Russian response kill more Georgians than Israel’s response has killed Palestinians?
Thanks for the recommendations, Daniel. I shall look them up.
In an ideal world, both Israel and Hamas would scrupulously follow international law. In this world, both are loathe to accept its terms, and both have legions of people who troll around blogs and message boards deploring the other side’s violations, as if it excuses their own.
Look, you can live in a fantasy world where in a completely asymmetric conflict, involving one of the most densely populated areas of the world, the actor with no sophisticated arms, no air defense, no modern military hardware, no military bases, etc., sets up camp out where its nemesis, one of the world’s leading military powers armed to the teeth with the most sophisticated military weaponry money can buy can – and will – bomb it into oblivion. Or you can accept that we’re in the real world, and that any force of any sort that wishes to stand up to that first world military force is going to try to hide its weapons and members in places where they won’t be picked off in what amounts to a turkey shoot. Make whatever judgment you want of that group, but you’ll find that this is always the case – and if you know your history, you know that it was the case when the future leaders of Israel were resisting the British Mandate, and how anti-Nazi resistant movements operated during WWII. Do you have anything to say about that, other than “That’s different”?
“Didn’t the Russian response kill more Georgians than Israel’s response has killed Palestinians?”
Well, no, I don’t think it did, but I did not in any way support Russian operations outside of South Ossetia, and I certainly never attempted to justify the expulsions of Georgian villagers from Ossetia. I called Russian actions outside Ossetia unnecessary, foolish and disproportionate, among other things, and I said that the Russians shouldn’t be doing them. You can check my August archives if you don’t believe me. Indeed, at one point I compared the Russian attacks on Gori, Poti and other locations in Georgia to the Israeli bombing of Lebanon and deemed them excessive.
My “support” for the Russian operation inside “Georgia proper” was much like my being an “apologist for Putin”–non-existent. The Russians did have some right to retaliate for the attack on Tskhinvali, where some of their troops were killed in the initial attacks, and they were technically within their legal rights as the internationally mandated peacekeeping force to repel the Georgian assault. Yes, I know that they were abusing that role, using the enclaves as proxies and using the proxies to project their power, but their military presence in the enclaves had some limited legality. When they went beyond that, I did not offer any words of support for what they were doing and said that it was unwise and wrong for them to do as they did. What I did do was to hold Saakashvili responsible for escalating the conflict. Incidentally, the person playing Saakashvili’s role in the current conflict is not Haniyeh, but Olmert. The difference is that there is no larger power that is going to intervene against Olmert and widen the conflict beyond the enclave.
Daniel,
Maybe saying you supported everything Russia did is an overstatement. I’m not even disagreeing with you on your assessment of that situation. I pretty much found what you had to say quite valid. But I do recall that you spent most of your time not in condemning Russia’s “overreaction”, but in condemning those who thought Russia’s overreaction was the problem, when the real problem was Georgia’s provocation.
Similarly, in this case one can easily accuse Israel of overreacting to Hama’s provocation, but I wonder why you seem to be spending most of your time condemning Israel, rather than Hamas. Especiallly in that while Russia is not facing a serious threat from Georgian vows to destroy it, but Israel is indeed facing a serious threat from Palestinian and other Muslim countries’ desire to destroy Israel. The worldwide reaction to Israel’s actions here seem as out of line to me as the reactions to Russia’s invasion of Georgia did over the summer.
I don’t support Israel’s disproportionate reaction any more than I supported Russia’s. I think both took things too far, and used the provocation as an excuse to take care of a little bit of business that had been bothering them for a while. But in both cases the moral fault lies in those who cynically provoked a war in the first place in the hope that it would end up advantaging them by bringing in world condemnation and outside support, and I think that’s what ought to be condemned, rather than excused by putting all the blame on the side of the stronger military power. And I may be wrong in the causalty figures, but I had last read that the Russians killed something like 1,000-1,500 Georgians during their war, whereas thus far Israel has killed less than 500 Palestinians. If you have access to more reliable numbers I’d appreciate hearing about it.
How do you define “serious threat”? Are you seriously suggesting that Hamas, or any nation in the Arab world, poses an existential threat to Israel? That Palestinian “forces” could even cross the border into Israel before being cut to ribbons? Please explain.
If we’re talking a war of words, Arab words against Israel are as cutting as they come. But you know, sticks and stones.
Yes, the total Palestinian effort to destroy the state of Israel is a serious threat to Israel’s existence, even if that threat has littel chance of succeeding by Hamas’ actions alone. Be reminded that Israel has fought several pan-Arab wars for its own existence over this issue, and that the whole military policy of the Palestinians is to keep attacking Israel in its pathetic, suicidal and self-martyring ways in order to draw other Arab nations into the conflict, such as Iran.
I would consider anyone lobbing hundreds of rockets into my tiny country a threat, especially if they vowed to destroy my country entirely. That they cannot by themselves destroy Israel’s very existence does not make them an unserious threat, especially since their armaments are supplied to them by Arabs and Iranians with large armies of their own.
The attacks of 9/11 did not threaten the existence of the US, but they were still considered by most people to represent a serious threat. Or do you think the only threats worth considering seriously are those of total annihilation?
If we are going to assert that any threat, no matter how trivial, is a “serious” threat then certainly… every threat is serious. That doesn’t actually address my point, but perhaps it’s your best response.
Watching on the news the Israeli build up for the attack into Gaza, it was clear they do not consider Hamas a military threat. Tanks and personnel were bunched up, in plain sight, and soldiers were strolling around, often without helmet or protective gear. They did not fear rocket attacks, as well they shouldn’t.
Hamas of course do not really have any real army to deploy or military bases to operate from. They are poor and ill equipped and can only resort to terror tactics.
On the other hand, Hamas’ lack of resources makes their rocket attacks more confounding. These attacks kill about one Israeli civilian per 30-40 rockets fired. As terror tactics go, this does not seem to be working at all. The rockets are WWII technology at best, and still are costly to produce. So why do they persist?
Increased security in Israel has made it harder to carry out suicide bombings, and more importantly, the man on the street in the arab world no longer support such attacks.So Hamas must instead provoke an Israeli reaction, complete with civilian casualties, to gather support.
Unlike the suicide bomber, the Quassam rocket comes with a return address. The use of a rocket weapon also make these random terror attacks look more like a military problem. For the military men who work in all layers of Israeli government, solving this problem is hard to resist.
And here we are. The population of Gaza will suffer again. And no, they do not “deserve it” for having elected Hamas, any more than Israeli civilians deserve rocket attacks for their govenment’s mistreatment of Palestinians. Hamas has brought war upon innocent people to make themselves look heroic. And Israel is helping them to it.
expertlaw,
I’d agree that trivial threats should not be taken seriously, but hundreds of rockets filled with explosives shooting into one’s country is not one of those. I’m not sure how trivial you would think such threats were if they were landing in your vicinity.
Dan,
I’d agree that the rocket attacks on Israel make no military sense whatsoever, except as a deliberate provocation. They have made the attacks so blatant that they must know Israel can’t help but respond militarily. In fact, that appears to be the entire purpose of the attacks. So blaming Israel for the invasion seems silly, in that it seems Hamas has desired just such an invasion. The civilians who die as a result certainly don’t deserve this even if they voted for Hamas, but it does suggest that they shouldn’t support Hamas now or in the future, if they want to avoid Israeli invasions. Of course, if civilians do support these provocations against Israel, I’m not sure how we can refrain from blaming them for the deaths of themselves and their children that result.