18 Responses to “From The Department Of Horrid Ideas”

1. Charlie, on March 14th, 2009 at 10:29 pm Said:

   This “rumor” about Sweden seems absurd on its face, unless there are better reasons Sweden might be considering NATO membership beyond what Stratfor mentions.

   They contend that Sweden might want NATO membership because “Sweden and Russia have a long and contentious history”, but the last serious confrontation they mention is the Finnish War, which ended 200 years ago. In the meantime Sweden has managed to avoid losing any more territory to Russia despite not allying with other European countries or the United States.

   Stratfor also contends that membership would allow Sweden “to remain a regional power, since joining the alliance would allow Sweden to monitor other NATO states like Germany–which is again on the rise.” But if a rising Germany didn’t compel Sweden to abandon armed neutrality in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it’s hard to see why Swedish politicians would make a different decision now. Is Merkel more intimidating than Bismarck or Hitler?

   I’m going to assume this is a baseless rumor unless someone can provide a reason why Sweden might want NATO membership that doesn’t sound like complete baloney.

2. Daniel Larison, on March 14th, 2009 at 10:48 pm Said:

   Well, if you’d told me ten years ago that people would be seriously arguing that Georgia should become a member of NATO, I would have said that you were on drugs. An alliance that has no reason for existing apparently has to keep expanding to stay relevant, and if it can’t expand east maybe it will try to go north.

3. Charlie, on March 14th, 2009 at 11:19 pm Said:

   I agree with you about NATO’s reasons (or non-reasons) for possibly wanting to expand northward. I just don’t see why Sweden would be remotely interested in abandoning a foreign policy that has kept it prosperous and at peace for two centuries. It’s pretty clear why NATO membership appeals to many people and politicians in former Soviet satellite states and SSRs. But Sweden isn’t in remotely the same position, either objectively or psychologically.

   If the rumor is that NATO might approach Sweden about membership I can believe it; if the rumor is that Sweden might seriously consider NATO membership I’m skeptical.

4. bayesian, on March 15th, 2009 at 12:19 am Said:

   I agree that bringing either Sweden or Finland into NATO doesn’t make any sense for any party, unless either one is looking to provoke Russia or one expects Russia to become far far more aggressive in the Baltic than they show any signs of becoming.

   Indeed, the much-maligned Finlandization struck me as a very sane response on the part of the Finns (and, actually, the Soviets also) to Finland’s geopolitical situation post-WW2. While I can certainly understand Finns viewing Russia with suspicion and apprehension given the last two centuries, I know of no post-WW2 Soviet or Russian behavior that would lead one to believe that the Russians have suddenly lost their senses vis a vis Finland; indeed the return of Porkkala in 1956 showed excellent sense.

   On the other hand, the equivalence you seem to be trying to drawn between Finland and Georgia seems vastly overblown; for example:

   Finland has been independent and broadly recognized as such for eighty years rather than eighteen; the borders are not in question. Indeed Finland is a quite full fledged member of the developed world and international community in ways Georgia, for all its much much longer and richer history, can only dream of. The Soviets perhaps made a mistake in levying the post-WW2 reparations which forced Finland to industrialize.

   AFAIK Finland has no internal separatist groups; Abkhazia and South Ossettia are a big part (though hardly all) of what makes Georgia so problematic. Karelian irredentism exists in Finland but again AFAIK it’s not a meaningful force (I welcome correction there).

   I can’t at the moment think of any reason not to consider Finland a very successful state both politically and economically; the fact that they seem to be following a fairly typical social-democratic trajectory may have a poor prognosis, but no more so than e.g. Denmark which has been a perfectly good if fairly minor NATO member.

   In a weird sort of way bringing Georgia into NATO (which I think would be insane) makes a half-sense; Georgia’s very weakness makes it an attractive seeming target to those who want to ratchet up a containment boundary around Russia. Finland’s relative strength and high stability makes it unnecessary to be in NATO.

5. jetan, on March 15th, 2009 at 6:39 am Said:

   Bringing Finland into the Alliance would be insane, no doubt about it. But no more insane than bringing in, say, Lithuania which would have been fightin ‘words at almost any time in history. None of these countries are defensible at all, and none of them have any strategic or military importance to us. This is all, if you will forgive my language, a bunch of Maginot Line bullshit. In fact, the only thing that gives this story a disturbing sheen of credibility is that Sweden and Finland have both been so often imperiled by the old Soviet Union that they have every reason to desire NATO membership. Of course, this is precisely the reason none of the member countries should even consider it.

   I am sorry but I cannot envision fully mobilized Finnish or Swedish forces holding out for even a week against a serious deployment of Russian force. unless they had immediate NATO help. And, as we may recall from the Georgian fiasco, there are some serious logistical problems in physically moving our forces and materiel to perform the most modest supporting role. In fact….and I will of course defer to the more military types here….I would suspect that just preparing to provide such support would involve the most terrifying Dr. Manhattan style build-up. Even at it’s weakest Russia would have a hard time swallowing any of this.

   I find it incredible that, with all of our other foreign commitments and our current economic gelding, any of us are even discussing these issues.

   I am like the worst sort of John LeCarre Circus Russophile….I have a fascination with their Church, their history, their music and their literature. But my affection doesn’t blind me to the fact that they are a very dangerous country. Therefore I think that our foreign policy would be greatly simplified if we showed some restraint in “screwing with their heads”.

6. jetan, on March 15th, 2009 at 6:57 am Said:

   Charlie, I think you are forgetting the 1939 “Winter War” in which Sweden came very, very close to deploying troops in support of Finland and in opposition to Russia. And even without taking a military hand they did more or less proclaim a diplomatic alliance with Sweden. Now, as then, the “Winter War” tends to get ignored because of the proximity to the German invasion of Poland as was doubtless the Soviet intention.

7. Dan W, on March 15th, 2009 at 1:24 pm Said:

   A dispatch from Finland:

   Finland is fully NATO compatible already. Senior NATO officials have repeatedly said Finland would be welcomed into the alliance any time. But should we join? No. We have better diplomatic and economic relations with Russia than any other nation on her border. We have an army based on conscription that gives us a wartime force of 350 000 men, one of the biggest in Europe. Our military is trained in our own land, to defend our own land. This we are fully capable of doing.

   Over here these are serious issues. Sweden has chosen to radically cut down on her armed forces, we have not. Russia has regained military strength but is not a threat in the near future.

8. Dan W, on March 15th, 2009 at 1:34 pm Said:

   …sorry, hit submit button early.

   In conclusion, nations in Northern Europe do what serves their security best. NATO in my opinion is not the best option. Not for now.

   Thanks to jetan for sober views and pointing out the absurdity of comparing Finland with Georgia. Daniel, you should know better…

9. Daniel Larison, on March 15th, 2009 at 2:01 pm Said:

   There’s nothing absurd about it. No, they’re not comparable in their political or economic development or their experience during the Soviet period, but they both border Russia, and both have long histories of being ruled by Russians. Unlike the Georgians, the Finns have waged major wars with the Russians prior to the 21st century, and Finnish independence after Brest-Litovsk was established partially through the support of Germany, which would tend to associate the existence of an independent Finland with memories of invasion and military defeat. If you want to gauge what a Russian response to serious consideration of Finnish membership in NATO would look like, look at how Moscow responded to similar treatment of Georgia, and try to imagine how much worse the response would be.

   If anything, the comparison with Georgia is inadequate because it fails to convey how much riskier it is to bring Finland into the Alliance given the far more serious conflicts between the two countries over the past century. The point is not that Finland=Georgia, which would be a silly thing to say and which was something that I did not say. The point is that the same dynamic of provocation and response would repeat itself on a larger scale. Perhaps someone can *explain* to me what it is that I have wrong here.

10. Daniel Larison, on March 15th, 2009 at 2:09 pm Said:

    By the way, one of the reasons why the fledgling Georgian republic succumbed to the Soviets was that it had no comparable ally that Finland had in Germany. Had the Georgians enjoyed similarly significant aid, perhaps they would have escaped Soviet control in the wake of WWI and lasted as an independent state at least until WWII. The success of Finnish independence and the failure of Georgian independence in that period were contingent on a number of things, and the outcomes could have been different. This is not to say that Finland and Georgia today are anything alike, but that Finland’s fate might easily have been more like that of Georgia.

    One final point: the comparison was focused entirely on how Moscow would respond to the idea of Finnish membership. I don’t see how anyone could read the final sentence of the post and conclude that I was comparing Finland and Georgia to each other as if they were similar states. The reference to Georgia is to emphasize the lesson we ought to have learned from NATO expansion gone awry.

11. Dan W, on March 15th, 2009 at 2:35 pm Said:

    Daniel, thank you for your response. What I disagreed with was your last paragraph:

    “As we saw with Georgia, the promotion of one of Russia’s neighbors as a potential member of the Alliance can both embolden the neighbor in its actions against Russia and invite Russian incursions”

    This runs contrary to Finnish policies since 1809, and especially our policies since 1944. Finland never provokes Russia. Not provoking Russia is what we do best. We have no “actions against Russia” to be emboldened in.

    I do agree that our entry into NATO, in and by itself, would be considered a provocation by Russia, and it is another reason not to go that way.

12. Daniel Larison, on March 15th, 2009 at 2:46 pm Said:

    “I do agree that our entry into NATO, in and by itself, would be considered a provocation by Russia…”

    Prior to Saakashvili’s election, there was not much history of Georgian provocation of Russia, either. It was largely, but not entirely, his enthusiasm for bringing Georgia into NATO that angered Moscow so strongly. I agree that Finland has no history of picking fights with Russia, and I acknowledge that there are no “frozen conflicts” along the border that Russia could exploit as a pretext, but seriously considering alliance membership would itself cause a harsh response. So I don’t think we really disagree much at all here.

    I am fairly sure that Finns would never elect a hot-headed nationalist of Saakashvili’s character anyway, and as we all seem to agree Finland has no reason to enter the alliance. I would like to think that this talk of Finnish membership is no more meaningful than the hype about hypothetical Russian bombers in Cuba.

13. jetan, on March 15th, 2009 at 4:07 pm Said:

    Thank you Dan W, for providing some hard numbers on Finnish potential troop strength. However, I find it challenging to believe that Finland could actually field that many troops with the rapidity that might be required in the event of a conflict with Russia. Perhaps more to the point, is Finland capable of effectively equipping it’s forces without NATO assistance? i suspect that their actual strength would fall far short of the 350,000 mark. I don’t mean to dis Finland, as I have a cousin who is a citizen there, but I don’t think they are a sleeping giant, either.

    It seems pretty clear that the Finns, for all their occaionally troubled history, are a nation with a good track record in terms of independence from Mother Russia -in fact, I think their major tension has more often been with Sweden – whereas Georgia has been more of a Russian Vassal state or province of Russia, at least within recent memory (boy, did I just piss some Georgians off). It may be that, as Mr. Larison says, admitting Finland to NATO would be comparable to a Russian alliance with Canada….but an alliance with Georgia would be, in some ways, more like a Russian relationship with Puerto Rico. I realize the analogy is far from perfect, but I think the russians might find it just as emotionally difficult.

14. J, on March 16th, 2009 at 11:10 am Said:

    My problem with this analysis is that it is overly empirical. The story/pattern since roughly 1980 is that of Russian imperial/hegemonic retreat. I agree there is a difference in narrative and dynamics between Russia’s possessions and hegemony in Europe and those in Asia. Georgia joining NATO would have been a coupling of the two that would have been terrible- in fact, possibly quite advantageous to the Russians in the incoherence and conflicts that would inevitably have added into the workings of the alliance. Georgia properly belongs in a political and perhaps military alliance of countries to the south of the Caucasus.

    But if you are strategic planner for Sweden or Finland, or Poland, the western borders of Russia and its influence sphere and where political borders happen to be drawn amount to almost one continuous series of badly resolved or unresolved issues from the Nordkap or White Sea to the Black Sea. Sure, there is some risk for the Scandinavian countries in siding with NATO. But the risk is short term, with the long term outlook that Russia is net in retreat to its cultural homeland territories. Sure, under Putin there is an efficient maximizing of economic power and getting the largest possible amount of it in the hands of the Russian state, in effect stalling the retreat and trying to reverse it. But that doesn’t look enduring: working against it are the weakness of Russian industries, the rise of a middle class and its demands, population decline and urbanization, and the extend to which the existing economic power is based in a transient and volatile resource- oil and gas.

    As concerns Scandinavia, Murmansk is trouble enough to subsidize as a military base of low practical remaining value. At best it has a future as a Russian oil industry outpost in reindeer herding country for another decade or two or three. The Baltic borders are under pressure but are not going to change; that will have to be accepted by Moscow eventually. Russian occupied East Prussia is a deliberately ignored subject, but when the Baltics and Poland are sufficiently strong it will become an issue. Southward there will certainly be more acrimony, likely even violence, to achieve resolutions of corruptions, historical grudges, boundaries, and cultural divisions in Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldava. And lastly there is Russia’s encircled and fading last ally in the Balkans, Serbia, to keep in mind.

    NATO planners in Brussels strike me as evidently constructing the configuration necessary to contain threats and outbreaks of violence that arise from these issues. Sure, from the Russian p.o.v. it looks like encroachment. But if the issues and countries and regions suggested are indeed inevitable centers of dispute and confrontations and negotiation during the next decade or two or three, the NATO initiative is arguably practical at core.

15. Dan W, on March 16th, 2009 at 12:49 pm Said:

    jetan, we actually could field said number of troops on short notice. And no, they would not all be that well equipped. As military hardware is not getting any cheaper our wartime force will be reduced to 250 000 within the next few years.

    I would argue that even from a military point of view a NATO membership is not necessarily a blessing.

    In discussing these matters, I would like to remind all you over there that the military needs of small European nations are totally different from yours. Realistically, if we are attacked by a superpower such as Russia we might in the long run lose the war. The simple solution is to build a credible defense, to make the aggressor understand that any possible victory will come at a price that is far to great.

    Joining a larger alliance alters the equation. Suddenly we might find ourselves on the frontlines of some greater struggle. The stakes will be much higher and the damage we can bring upon the aggressor might be a price he is willing to pay. Other members of the alliance might think the fight is better fought on our ground than theirs. History knows many allies who brought more harm on each other than their enemies ever did.

16. Dan W, on March 16th, 2009 at 1:13 pm Said:

    …Also, NATO forces in Eastern Europe are not always contributing to the security of their hosts. The suggested missile shield in Poland is a prime example. It would not in any way make Poland safer from attack. In fact, it invites an attack.

    Of course, if you have a common obligation you must shoulder your part of the weight. But what if these common obligations distract you from what you really ought to be doing, and drain resources you might spend closer to home.

    NATO today also exist to project the power of her core allies all over the world. That is perfectly OK. Superpowers do what superpowers have always done. It is your money to spend.

    But, again, smaller nations have different priorities. We avoid war, at all times. We need to prepare for war, in the way it would be fought right here where we live, making the most of what resorces we have. We must choose what serves us best. NATO it isn’t.

17. jetan, on March 16th, 2009 at 2:16 pm Said:

    I see your point now, Dan W. Thank you for explaining it further.

18. Gordianus, on March 16th, 2009 at 9:52 pm Said:

    Russia continues to see the world in 19th Century balance of power terms. She also see’s her relations with other countries in the old Blood and Soil mold, eg Serbia. We have missed or misplayed many opportunities to build good relations with Russia since the end of the Cold War. In that regard I think that we had no business entertaining the project of extending NATO membership to Ukraine, or Georgia. They were both part of the old Russian Empire. But that empire contained (imprisoned) populations that have more in common with Paris than Moscow. Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden, Finland etc. are clearly more culturally Western.

    I take Dan W’s point that Finland and Sweden may have reasons of their own to remain outside the alliance. But should Finland wish to join, Russia should be made to understand that she has no veto power over Scandinavian political arrangements.

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