I agree that the scale of the military commitment is small compared to the “surge” (which failed in its political goals and therefore failed on its own terms), but for all of the structural reasons why the “surge” was never likely to succeed in achieving politicial reconciliation the nation-building enterprise is also unlikely to succeed in reaching any of its goals.

The problem in Afghanistan is not one of massive internecine fighting between sectarian groups; civilian insecurity is nowhere near as great as it was in Iraq. The “surge” model is almost entirely beside the point. What will matter is whether Petraeus can successfully bribe elements of the Taliban as he bribed Anbar Sunni militias. The rest of the nation-building project is a waste and a distraction. Of course, we have yet to determine whether the fix in Anbar was just a temporary one or something more than that.

The borderlands of Pakistan have been lawless (or rather, outside control of central government) and will by and large continue to be for a very long time to come. If we define success as eliminating a near-permanent feature of that part of the world, we will necessarily fail. If we do things to try to shore up the Pakistani state, rather than undermine it, we might have some limited success. At this point, what we need to aim for is containing the damage already done to Pakistani stability and creating minimally stable conditions in Afghanistan that permit us to withdraw and turn entirely to a containment approach. If we actually aim for all the goals Obama is laying out, I don’t see things ending well.

It will be part of an ambitious effort whose scope American commanders here dare not name or admit to, even to themselves: nation-building on a grand scale. To succeed, they must overcome the Afghan landscape itself: a sprawling expanse of high desert wrinkled with tortuous hills and wave upon wave of cathedral-like mountain ranges that segment the population into countless valleys and separate regions. Indeed, for the first time since the U.S. invaded here in late 2001, Americans are about to lead a great battle against culture and geography.

What is worth noting in Kaplan’s assessment is that Afghanistan is, as we know, much less receptive to central government control, which makes nation-building even more foolhardy than I still think it is in Iraq, but the security threat to Kabul from the Taliban is less grave. Moving forces into the south and continuing drone attacks across the border all seem sure to make our position less tenable in the coming years. Preventing Pakistan from being destabilized ought to be the top priority, and almost everything in the Taliban-centric approach we are seeing does not aid in stabilizing Pakistan, but seems likely to have the opposite effect.

This push must be joined by a dramatic increase in our civilian effort. Afghanistan has an elected government, but it is undermined by corruption and has difficulty delivering basic services to its people. The economy is undercut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency. The people of Afghanistan seek the promise of a better future. Yet once again, we’ve seen the hope of a new day darkened by violence and uncertainty.

So to advance security, opportunity and justice — not just in Kabul, but from the bottom up in the provinces — we need agricultural specialists and educators, engineers and lawyers. That’s how we can help the Afghan government serve its people and develop an economy that isn’t dominated by illicit drugs. And that’s why I’m ordering a substantial increase in our civilians on the ground. That’s also why we must seek civilian support from our partners and allies, from the United Nations and international aid organizations — an effort that Secretary Clinton will carry forward next week in The Hague.

He’s talking about shifting the Afghan economy entirely away from opium poppies and into some other kind of activity–how does this not qualify as pie-in-the-sky? (The Taliban brought an end to the drug trade, thanks to extremely brutal rule, but how do we seriously propose to do this without resorting to those methods?) I don’t know why you have confidence that they won’t overcommit—he just did that in the speech! Oh, yes, and corruption is going to be brought to heel in a low-trust society with weak institutions, too–I forgot to mention that “realistic” goal.

However, there’s a difference between optimism and stupidity. Calling one the other does not make it so.

In my experience, people who challenge you to transcend realism are trying to sell something. But we knew that didn’t we?

This the same old “who lost China “stuff all over again..Just as the Democrats doubled down in Vietnam lest they cement their rep as a bunch of Commie Symps, so Obama appears prepared to fall all over himself for fear of wearing the “soft on terror” hat. This in spite of what seem to me pretty good instincts on Iraq, Gaza, etc..