Think Again
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Last Friday, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re-elected with about two-thirds of the vote. Supporters of his opponent, both inside and outside Iran, were stunned. A poll revealed that former Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi was beating Ahmadinejad. It is, of course, interesting to meditate on how you could conduct a poll in a country where phones are not universal, and making a call once you have found a phone can be a trial. A poll therefore would probably reach people who had phones and lived in Tehran and other urban areas. Among those, Mousavi probably did win. But outside Tehran, and beyond persons easy to poll, the numbers turned out quite different.
Some still charge that Ahmadinejad cheated. That is certainly a possibility, but it is difficult to see how he could have stolen the election by such a large margin. Doing so would have required the involvement of an incredible number of people, and would have risked creating numbers that quite plainly did not jibe with sentiment in each precinct. Widespread fraud would mean that Ahmadinejad manufactured numbers in Tehran without any regard for the vote. But he has many powerful enemies who would quickly have spotted this and would have called him on it. Mousavi still insists he was robbed, and we must remain open to the possibility that he was, although it is hard to see the mechanics of this. ~George Friedman
This matter of polling seems quite relevant, since I have heard quite often about these late polls showing Mousavi ahead by large margins or neck-and-neck with his opponent. This is treated as significant proof that massive fraud must have occurred. For much of our presidential election, we were frequently hearing about the “cell-phone effect” and the possibility that traditional phone polls were missing a lot of new voters who only used their cell phones. What if there were an even more distorting “no phone effect” that would make the results of polls skew heavily in favor of those who were far more likely to support Mousavi? What if Mousavi’s reported late surge was a chimera? How much of the Mousavi voters’ outrage is of the 1972 “no one I know voted for Nixon” variety? What if Iran’s so-called “silent majority” is not opposed to the regime as it currently exists as most observers seem to assume? The most important question might be this: why haven’t we been asking these and other questions from day one?
Friedman continues:
It also misses a crucial point: Ahmadinejad enjoys widespread popularity. He doesn’t speak to the issues that matter to the urban professionals, namely, the economy and liberalization. But Ahmadinejad speaks to three fundamental issues that accord with the rest of the country.
Friedman goes on to mention piety, corruption and national security as these three issues. Certainly, I thought that Ahmadinejad would pay a price for the country’s economic woes, but I may have erred by assuming that economic woes necessarily translated into anti-incumbent sentiment in Iranian presidential elections. What if Iranian voters are attracted to Ahmadinejad’s populist measures, even though the policies pursued under his tenure have been exacerbating Iran’s economic problems rather than ameliorating them? Suppose that “it’s not the economy, stupid” in Iran despite current economic woes. Why should Iranian elections be any less likely to turn on “values” questions than ours? Indeed, given the openly religious character of the regime and the still-limited power of the Iranian presidency, both of which would minimize the importance of technocratic policy debate, why wouldn’t “values” issues have an even greater role? Here is the most heretical thought of all: what if Ahmadinejad appears to a majority to be the real reformer, and Mousavi is seen as an ally of a corrupt establishment? The ambiguity and amorphousness of what “reform” means in the Iranian context should make us more careful in how we think about the political realities of the country.
Suppose for a moment that most Iranians see Ahmadinejad as a majority of Americans sees Obama. No doubt this will be considered an unspeakable comparison, but just think about it for a moment. Perhaps they like him personally, give him the benefit of the doubt, and find his opponents and their proposals to be ridiculous. As important as it is to understand the contesting interest groups involved, we should not rule out the role of personality and charisma in election outcomes. We see Ahmadinejad as a blundering buffoonish thug, but that does not mean that this is how most Iranians see him. Perhaps Iranian voters respond to economic insecurity by rallying to a religious, cultural populism that offers them some feeling of control and restored social stability. Perhaps they really do look askance at predominantly urban proponents of economical liberalization–it would hardly be the first time that the latter would be out of step with the broad majority of their countrymen.
Friedman continues:
Perhaps the greatest factor in Ahmadinejad’s favor is that Mousavi spoke for the better districts of Tehran — something akin to running a U.S. presidential election as a spokesman for Georgetown and the Lower East Side. Such a base will get you hammered, and Mousavi got hammered. Fraud or not, Ahmadinejad won and he won significantly. That he won is not the mystery; the mystery is why others thought he wouldn’t win.
One of the claims made in the “coup” argument is that it is implausible that there would be a swing in the electorate from backing Khatami just eight years ago to backing Ahmadinejad. It is quite possible that the events of the last eight years have changed voting preferences in Iran just as they have here. We might remember that two of the most lopsided presidential elections in our history occurred just eight years apart in 1964 and 1972, and the winners came from different parties and ostensibly represented significantly different political platforms. Without putting too much emphasis on such comparisons, they should make us think again about what we think we know about the last few days.
Filed under: foreign policy, politics
Obama made as much of a point during his interview with CNBC today, pointing out that the differences between the two politicians is arguably very little, and there was no significant chance that the election would undermine their nuclear program (which is controlled by the Khameni and the Rev. Guards), nor see a significant shift in their attitude towards America. Thus, whomever comes out on top, America is willing to deal with them, and more importantly, Khameni.
And this desire to work with the current regime, I believe, has the strongest chance of producing durable changes in how the system operates. As long as a significant portion (if not outright majority) of the country prefers a defensive crouch to America, the power of the military over internal politics is not only accepted, but arguably approved. Never under-estimate mass approval of wide-scale oppression. A nonplussed attitude from America is the quickest way to neuter such arguments.
I’m curious about the images of protesters carrying bilingual or English-only signs.
In part these images are published because of the natural bias of the Anglophone press. But to whom are the English-language signs supposed to appeal? How many Iranians are fluent in English?
Putin scored some easy nationalist points against Kasparov when he criticized the chess grandmaster for staging his protests in English. Can anti-Mousavi partisans make the same criticism?
The Lower East Side? The Lower East Side is basically an extension of Chinatown. I think Friedman means the Upper West Side, which is the stereotypical New York left-wing neighborhood.. Maybe he knows more about Iranian than US politics, though.
For explanations of why the announced Iranian election results are implausible, see http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/06/iran-does-have-some-fishy-numbers.html, and http://www.juancole.com/2009/06/stealing-iranian-election.html.
I found more convincing of possible fraud that they were apparently able to hand-count some 40 million folded paper ballots only 3 hours after voting ended. This coupled with the fact that Khamenei immediately certified the election whereas previous elections took 3 days to tally and certify the vote.
The key take-away related to American geo-political interests of this turbulent event is that it highlights Ahmadinejad as an impotent tail trying to wag a rebellious dog that is the Iranian citizenry.
Ahmadinejad is a puppet of the feckless mullahs. They have been locked into a little retrograde box by the Internet and the bravery of people who are fed up. That said, how is a totally bifurcated Iran a genuine threat to the US? The neo-cons want to attack Iran. The question now is, Why?
Ahmadinejad is a puppet of the feckless mullahs. They have been locked into a little retrograde box by the Internet and the bravery of people who are fed up.
Thats an amazing reading of the situation, considering the “opposition” (1) has made it clear that nuclear development will continue and (2) was part of the ruling regime that initiated the suicidal Iran-Iraq war and (3) is supported by a large player amongst the internal politics of the Guardian Council. There is little, if any, substance to suggest that people are for the destruction of a predominantly Islamic state, or even if there is much of a platform outside of some irritation over cultural-social issues. China conveniently vented such distinctly middle-class frustrations fairly well after Tienanmen Square and theres no obvious reasons why a similar relaxation couldn’t appease Iran’s middle-class.
That said, either way it goes its not any of our concern on a national level, and hopefully the less than concerned attitude of Obama will hold, silencing his neo-con and war-mongering critics.
Are you telling me that election results in a religious theocracy are, at best, tenuous? Who could have predicted!?!
Seriously, there’s a debate going on right now about national healthcare. The result of which will in all likelihood have a more profound and long-lasting affect on all Americans than whichever stooge of the Guardian Council gets to flounder on the global stage next. I’d love to hear about the dissident or paleo-conservative approach to healthcare. Is healthcare indeed a right? Should it be administered at the Federal level, or should state governments be charged with providing it? Will government expenditures into healthcare be a net loss, or will the financial stability that it imparts on families allow the economy to grow? Will national healthcare impart financial stability to families?
Please, anything other than Iran.
You are correct in noting that our own experiences prejudice the way in which we view others. I do not know much about situation in Iran. So, my comments should be taken more as a “devil’s advocate”.
A few points I would like to make:
1. In India, even exit poll results are quite contrary to the results of final elections. This has happened more-or-less consistently in the recent past. The opinion polls are known to miss the target quite significantly. For example, in 2004, they predicted strong majority for the incumbent, the opposition “won”; this elections, they predicted trouble for the incumbent, who “won” quite comfortably.
[I put "won" in quotes because we are a multi-party parliamentary democracy.]
It is very possible that the opinion polls failed to capture realities.
2. In countries like Iran, use of force does not imply “stealing of the election”. Regimes like these are not averse to using force against their own citizens, even if Ahmadenijad really won. In fact, a real victory with such a margin would make him feel entitled to using force… since he might feel he has won the political capital to do so.
3. University educated folks form a minority of Iranian population. Have similar unrest been reported elsewhere in Iran? Why not? If yes, would that not be more important to focus on. We are talking about rights of a vocal, educated minority; what about rights of a majority who’s views may be antithetical to ours?
A counterpoint raised by a few people is that if the junta wanted to rig the elections, why would they not to it subtly, say a slender margin for Ahmadenijad’s victory?
I think the reason is that subtlety is not their trait. They would rather go for “convincing (large) margins” than “justifiable margins”. Another aspect is a show of power: yes, I have rigged elections in such a ridiculous manner… I dare you to stop me from coming to power.
It will also serve well to keep in mind the way general people talk about elected leaders. Its fairly common to refer to the elected premiere as having “won the throne”, children of ex-premieres as “heir apparent” or “crown prince”. Had Bush been projected as “heir apparent” in 2000, his campaign would be DOA. Folks in India, on the other hand, could win elections by claiming to be close to “heir apparent”.
Clearly we are all speculating here and I think your scepticism is healthy. But Friedman’s claim that rigging the vote: “… would have required the involvement of an incredible number of people, and would have risked creating numbers that quite plainly did not jibe with sentiment in each precinct” seems to be borne out by events on the ground. Large, if not incredible numbers of people are coming forward to allege fraud. The protests throughout Iran could be taken as evidence that the results “did not jibe with sentiment”. Powerful enemies of Ahmadinejad have spotted or alleged fraud and called him on it. So if you will permit my own scepiticism I wonder why Friedman is so eager to identify events in Iran with inner-city elitism. Could it be that he, like Sullivan, is viewing Iran through the perspective of American politics?
Health care policy is the quintessentially boring subject.
How paint dries, for example, is much more interesting.
“Could it be that he, like Sullivan, is viewing Iran through the perspective of American politics?”
That’s certainly possible. The “pious poor” vs. “wealthy urbanite” dichotomy can be exaggerated, but the examples of Russia and Venezuela keep haunting me. In those countries two-thirds of the people really have backed Putin/Medvedev and Chavez, and then we see fraud and violence in addition to that. It seems very plausible to me that the relatively more “liberal” faction has a smaller social base and is alienated from the rest of the country, because this is frequently what happens in modernizing countries. In this respect, it might help to compare the electoral fortunes of Ahmadinejad and Erdogan, who both came to national power after being mayors of their respective large cities, tapped into their own varieties of Islamist populism, and campaigned against the establishment and the more technocratic and educated left. The continuing failure of most analysts to account for the role of religious sentiment in all of this is remarkable.
Analogies to our own elections are bound to be imperfect, and I wouldn’t ever rule out the possibility of significant vote rigging, but I am not persuaded that if we concede that the rigging occurred that the outcome is therefore fake. The point I believe that Friedman is making is that Ahmadinejad’s enemies would not have just called him on it after the fact, but would have announced the fraud to the world in advance.
I thought one of Friedman’s best points is that most everyone outside Iran is relying heavily on English-language sources. Obviously, so am I, but I think that should make us very wary of trusting accounts from English-language sources that purport to give us the inside information on what is happening in the country as a whole. The English-language sources may be telling the truth as far as they go, but may be offering just a partial picture. Then again, they may be selling us something, and I would have thought our experience with Iraqi exiles would make us more cautious about buying into stories that conform to our expectations, fears and assumptions.
Obama’s comments to MSNBC were refreshingly calm and prosaic.
To see the opposite of “calm and prosaic”, one would need to to take a gander at the shrill, pious, and hysterical bleatings of George Packer over at The New Yorker.
Doubting any English-language source assumes they have only a tenuous, if any, connection with sources inside Iran. This has been one of the extraordinary aspects of this event- the sheer number of people who have been trying to keep the world updated via Twitter, text, et al. We don’t have to rely on the assumptions of connected exiles with agendas of their own- we’re getting information, especially pictures and video, from people at ground level that has been enormously more informative than “classic” journalistic coverage thus far.
We rely on English sources because we speak English. An awful lot of those people with cell phones and computers in Iran do, too, and there are plenty of people who can translate for those who don’t. We sometimes forget just how ubiquitous our language of choice is around the world.
Friedman’s point is that Iranians who speak English are not representative of most Iranians, and relying on them as sources can lead us to misunderstand the internal politics of the country. If we are relying extensively on first-hand accounts by Iranian English-speakers, we may be missing what a majority of Iranians thinks about the election and its aftermath.