The Kiev Speech
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But though Bush 41 was in many respects a smashing foreign policy success, he also made a number of egregious missteps, including the notorious “Chicken Kiev” speech, in which he essentially endorsed the survival of the multinational Soviet empire and not the nationalist aspirations of Eastern Europe. ~Reihan Salam
That Kiev speech really sticks in the craw, doesn’t it? I haven’t heard so much about the elder Bush’s 1991 Kiev speech in the last fifteen years as I have heard about it in the last week and a half. It seems to be a touchstone for everyone dissatisfied with “crabbed realism,” as if the “nationalist aspirations of Eastern Europe” didn’t include the aspirations to displace and slaughter one’s neighbors, expel entire populations and pursue self-destructive policies in the name of restoring national glory. All of a sudden, nationalism in Europe, which was once the scourge that neoconservatives wanted to squash in the ’90s and which horrifies them when it takes peaceful, democratic forms in western Europe, has become something in retrospect that it was wrong to discourage at the end of the Cold War.*
Over the last eighteen years, the idea that there was something unforgiveably wrong in urging Ukrainians–whose country is now teetering on the brink of bankruptcy under the rule of squabbling kleptocrats–to resist seeking independence seems increasingly absurd. Warning against the dangers of nationalism as a multinational empire was coming apart at the seams was very sensible. The example of how the Ottoman Empire had come apart in the late 19th and early 20th centuries offered a sobering reminder that political fragmentation along nationalist lines in ethnically mixed societies can carry a high cost in human suffering. Given the experience of the Balkans and the Caucasus over the last eighteen years, does anyone want to look back and say that the President of the United States should have endorsed nationalist aspirations?
* I should add that neoconservatives have never had any trouble with anti-Russian nationalism, no matter what form it takes and no matter where it crops up, which is at least part of the reason why the Kiev speech must be so irritating.
Update: Of course, it doesn’t hurt to revisit what Bush actually said in 1991. For starters, there is this part:
I come here to tell you: We support the struggle in this great country for democracy and economic reform. And I would like to talk to you today about how the United States views this complex and exciting period in your history, how we intend to relate to the Soviet central Government and the Republican governments.
In Moscow, I outlined our approach: We will support those in the center and the Republics who pursue freedom, democracy, and economic liberty. We will determine our support not on the basis of personalities but on the basis of principles. We cannot tell you how to reform your society. We will not try to pick winners and losers in political competitions between Republics or between Republics and the center. That is your business; that’s not the business of the United States of America [bold mine-DL].
Do not doubt our real commitment, however, to reform. But do not think we can presume to solve your problems for you. Theodore Roosevelt, one of our great Presidents, once wrote: To be patronized is as offensive as to be insulted. No one of us cares permanently to have someone else conscientiously striving to do him good; what we want is to work with that someone else for the good of both of us. That’s what our former President said. We will work for the good of both of us, which means that we will not meddle in your internal affairs.
O, the villainy! Who would want to have these words on his conscience? I mean, treating other nations as if they weren’t children to be scolded and ordered about–what was the man thinking?
Looking back over the last eighteen years, during which time Washington has been obsessed with personalities, not principles, and preoccupied with picking winners and losers and telling people how to reform their societies, one wishes that there had been more of the wisdom the former President showed in Kiev and a lot less of the carping from his detractors.
Second Update: Reihan responds with a long, interesting post. It is well worth reading.
Filed under: foreign policy, politics
Thank you for looking up the speech and giving us the actual language.
Pretty sound for the “new world order” guy.
Quite. In fact, the phrase “new world order” is the most objectionable thing I think I can find in the speech. He may have been a bit over the top in gushing about Gorbachev’s accomplishments, but he was engaged in diplomacy at a sensitive time. Had his son ever given a speech like this, I imagine we would have heard about how marvelous and inspired it was from many of the same people who trot its name out today as some sort of curse word.
It’s interesting to be reminded that this speech was just a few weeks before the failed coup that was precipitated in part by Moscow proposing to grant more power to the republics. In the context of the time, it is actually more accurate to see this speech as a tacit acceptance of this proposed grant of powers to the republics under the banner of saying that it was none of our business how the Soviets organized things. So one might even argue that it had almost the exact opposite political significance inside the USSR at that time than the one that is commonly attributed to it–an affirmation of the limited decentralization then underway, rather than a dismissal of the aspirations of inhabitants of the republics. In any case, if this speech counts as a blunder, I’d like to have a lot more foreign policy blunders like it in the future.
It’s funny, I often find myself explaining to incredulous friends that Bush 41 was an underrated president, who managed the Great Communist Unwinding with a very good foreign policy team and a considerable degree of skill and dexterity. It’s too bad he never got his chance at a second term – I have little doubt that a continuation of Scowcroft/Baker would have never mishandled Somalia and Yugoslavia as egregiously as Clinton’s team managed to.
Considering the fact that Bush I – you know – was the guy who first *put* US troops in Somalia, with no real plan, I don’t think so.
As for managing the break-up of Yugoslavia, you’re basically asserting that he’d have had success with Balkan politics, which isn’t easy for outsiders.
To keep things in perspective, Bush was the one in charge when we recognized Bosnian independence, as well as the independence of Croatia, both of which made things a great deal more complicated and on the whole made the situation worse. It was all very well for Baker to say that we had no dog in the fight, but recognition of the new states lent support to separatism at just about the worst possible moment.
I also agree that the “handling” or “mishandling” of Somalia would never have come up had Bush not decided to intervene. Bush made mistakes and got plenty of things wrong. It just so happens that his speech in Kiev wasn’t one of those things.
BarryD – perhaps that’s why my friends are so often incredulous! :)
I guess it comes down to my use of the term _egregiously_. IIRC, Bush 41 had sent in a large force with specific goals to be achieved within a specific time frame. The egregious part to me would be Clinton’s reduction of the force even as their mission expanded into playing _Somalian Sheriff_ and hunting Adid, as well as engaging in the UN-Boutros-Ghali desired goal of nation building. The original deployment’s wisdom can certainly be questioned, but I cannot see a more prudent Bush making the same _this is a pickle_ mistakes that Clinton did.
Additionally, I wasn’t asserting that he’d have had _success_ in Yugoslavia which, as you so rightly point out, has been the chief migraine inducer of many a government. Rather, it’s my opinion that the Bush team – allegedly realpolitikers all – would likely have handled things more adroitly.
Would have’s and could have’s – what would life be without them?
Cheers.
“The egregious part to me would be Clinton’s reduction of the force even as their mission expanded into playing _Somalian Sheriff_ and hunting Adid, as well as engaging in the UN-Boutros-Ghali desired goal of nation building.”
Continued intervention in Somalia would make enemies (or rather, that continuing intervention means that US forces were not a temporary problem, but one which certain factions could no longer simply outw-wait). This would mean that the US would be involved in a civil war, and would either engage in nation building, get out after a frustrating time, or continue on, accomplishing nothing but taking casualties and tarnishing the SuperForce rep that US forces had after the first Gulf War. In terms of force size, remember that the second Gulf War swallowed up far larger forces.
When it comes to ‘nation building’, or counter guerrilla work, the US military’s technological force multiplier goes from perhaps 10X to a fewX. The only way to win at that are to use local forces on the ground, with US air, logistical and naval support, and a Green Beret force. Bush I broke that rule from the start.
“Bush I broke that rule from the start.”
BarryD, I agree with all you’ve said: my point is that the _nation building_, driven by Boutros-Ghali and accepted by Clinton, was _not_ what Bush wanted the US involved in. The original plan was for the 35,000+ US soldiers to supervise and enforce the distribution of (media-driven) aid, principally food to the starving populace. The taking on of such a task in a little-known country of no vital strategic importance to the United States was certainly questionable proposition. From Halberstam’s book _War in a Time of Peace_ it was said that Powell favored a rapid in-and-out deployment to Somalia in order to forestall being sucked into the Balkan vortex. Scowcroft and Baker apparently were quite dubious about the plan from the start.
With timely help from the Somali expertise of Special Envoy Oakley, the food aid was delivered, accomodations were reached with Adid, and the US force was respected and things were moderately improving. In the original Bush plan the troops were to be out by no later than the end of January. That they were still there a half-year later, performing a far different mission, with a far different US/UN makeup, was a situation I don’t believe would have played out in the same fashion if Bush had received a second term.
Bush I may have broken the rules of NB/CG work, but such work was not, IIRC and IMO, what was actually anticipated.
Cheers.