What If?
Posted on June 30th, 2009
by Daniel Larison |
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Kevin Casas-Zamora makes the strongest anti-Zelaya case for criticizing the Honduran military’s actions as illegal. He does not contest that Zelaya was the one most responsible for the crisis, and he accepts that Zelaya was acting illegally, but believes that this was the wrong remedy. Fair enough, but let’s try a thought experiment about this question anyway. We are appropriately wary of people who invoke a political crisis to justify extraordinary and extra-legal measures. This sort of rhetoric can be so easily abused for the sake of augmenting and consolidating the power of those in government that we should normally be skeptical of such claims. That said, isn’t it the case that the response of Honduran political and military institutions to presidential illegalities is exactly the one that most of the Western world has been openly desiring in Iran?
Isn’t one of the main problems in Iran that the military and interior ministry colluded with Ahmadinejad in his crime? Suppose they had grabbed him on June 12, the day of the election, and thus prevented him from carrying out his fraudulent power-grab. Would we take seriously for a moment anyone gravely intoning about the need for proper procedure and rejecting the result as an illegal action against the democratically-elected president? (Obviously not, because very few, even the most ardent Mousavi cheerleaders, genuinely think of Iran as having anything like a real democratic process.) One way to look at the Honduran situation is that the political and military institutions removed Zelaya early on rather than permitting him to continue to abuse his office. They did what their counterparts in Iran could not or would not do. Indeed, one might go so far as to say that they were able to take such action because Honduras is a constitutional democracy in many important respects that Iran simply isn’t.
The protesters in Iran are claiming to be standing up for the integrity of their constitution and laws, and they seem to have a good case that the government has violated both. As a practical matter, we know that the protesters were never likely to succeed in removing Ahmadinejad from power unless and until military and security forces turned against him. Ahmadinejad’s IRGC and Basij connections and their commanders’ opposition to the political forces behind Mousavi make that very unlikely, but for the sake of argument suppose that it happened. More to the point, suppose Khamenei ordered these forces to arrest Ahmadinejad and remove him from office. The rest of the world would call this a revolution, and all of Mousavi’s international enthusiasts would be over the moon. No one would care how it happened, so long as it happened. When something like this actually happens in Honduras to a president we have not been conditioned to loathe, but who actually has far less political support in his country’s political and military institutions, whose tenure has been no less of a failure and whose designs on perpetuating his own power are apparently no less unscrupulous than Ahmadinejad’s, suddenly we are all aflutter about the terrible coup and the crime against democracy that has taken place.
Despite the serious inconsistency on one level, there is a common thread connecting the overzealous pro-Mousavi Westerners to the overreacting international condemnation of the Micheletti government in Honduras. What really irks Westerners who have invested so much energy into Mousavi’s cause is not that Iranian laws were broken or its constitution violated, but that the will of the majority was presumably thwarted and in any case the people were denied their voice. Mousavi believes he is fighting for the integrity of the Islamic republican system and its rules; his Western admirers embrace him (however absurdly) as a symbol of majoritarian democracy. Even though the whole of Honduras’ political class was in agreement that Zelaya had to go because they believe he threatened the Honduran constitution, this does not matter to the rest of the world. Zelaya is a populist demagogue who apparently still has considerable mass support, and it is his democratic support that counts for far more in the view of the rest of the world than his lack of respect for constitutional limits. When a democratic force is on the side of the law, it is lauded and praised, and when it is opposed to the law it is lauded and praised. This is phenomenally stupid and ideological, but there is at least some predictable pattern in it.
Filed under: democracy, foreign policy, politics
You have an interesting point. Most believers in democracy (in USA, Europe and elsewhere) subconsiously want the head of government to be an elected dictator to a certain extent. There is a tension between the old 19th century liberal constitutionalism and 20th century democracy. Carl Schmitt wrote many essays about that. In all western democracies, the tendency is for the executive to usurp the power of the legislature, particularly during emergencies… look at TARP!
I think your analysis is unconvincing. The difference between Iran and Honduras is that Honduras had democratic, constitutional means of redressing the issues posed by Zelaya’s actions. The people of Iran did not. The use of armed force is only justified if all peaceful, legal means are first exhausted. For all that, it’s worth noting that the Iranian protesters have, in fact, been protesting peacefully.
What really irks Westerners who have invested so much energy into Mousavi’s cause is not that Iranian laws were broken or its constitution violated, but that the will of the majority was presumably thwarted and in any case the people were denied their voice.
Even though the whole of Honduras’ political class was in agreement that Zelaya had to go because they believe he threatened the Honduran constitution, this does not matter to the rest of the world.
I see what you did there. You are equating the Honduran “political class” with the Iranian people as a whole. Moreover, the statement that the government and people of Honduras were unanimously against Zelaya seems born of uncritical acceptance of statements by anti-Zelaya forces. Currently the largest Honduran labor unions are on general strike protesting the coup, and there have been attacks by government forces on protesters.
whose tenure has been no less of a failure and whose designs on perpetuating his own power are apparently no less unscrupulous than Ahmadinejad’s,
This is pure propaganda. Now calling for a non-binding referendum is to be equated with forging the results of an entire election?
Gilligan, there’s no concrete evidence of “forging the results of an entire election.” And the “nonbinding referendum” (talk about spouting pure propaganda) was declared illegal.
And how do you know the Hondurans had “democratic, constitutional means of redressing the issues posed by Zelaya’s actions”? The Supreme Court declared his referendum illegal. His attorney general refused to carry out the referendum as did the chief of the military. His response was to fire the head of the military and storm an air force base with a mob to sieze the referendum ballots. On what basis do you conclude Zelaya would adhere to a constitutional removal? Why does the evidence not more support that he would whip mob chaos that would result in actual bloodshed as opposed to merely the arrest and removal of a self-serving demagogue?
And this one is really cute? “You are equating the Honduran “political class” with the Iranian people as a whole. Moreover, the statement that the government and people of Honduras were unanimously against Zelaya seems born of uncritical acceptance of statements by anti-Zelaya forces.”
Just like the only basis for your conclusion that the “whole Iranian people” support Mousavi–an utterly absurd claim–is based on nothing more than the propaganda fed out to us by the Westernized elites and entrenched interests who support him.
That Honduran society is split over the action against Zelaya only bolsters Daniel’s point. Iran is most certainly split and the “reformers” may well be in the minority since most of the population lives outside urban centers. Yet, somehow a different standard applies to Honduras.
Daniel Larison’s last two sentences in this blog are spot on.
Justin Raimondo wrote a detailed analysis today on Honduras and various power plays amongst the various factions:
http://original.antiwar.com/justin/2009/06/30/history-haunts-honduras/
Elsewhere in TAC blogs, I have cited articles containing analysis from non-Western commentators about Iran. They take a critical look on the mechanics of the election process in Iran, leaders like Mousavi and Rafsanjani, their support base, and the many faceted corruption problems in Iran, all resulting in the current power play. Philip Giraldi wrote that he found one set of those analyses very convincing. Thus there is a counter narrative on Iran, but a lot of people in the west would rather prefer to have a belief in a good guy-bad guy scenario based on Twitter and You Tube.
There were a lot of street protests in 1953 in Iran prior to the overthrow of Mossadegh. We now know how genuine they were, how they were orchestrated, and how they were presented to the western audience, don’t we?
Bottom line: Just stay out of Iran and Honduras.
I’m not well informed enough to comment on the specifics of Iran and Honduras – I can accept the possibility that the Honduran president was a right chancer, and the military may have done the wrong thing for the right reason – just because I don’t like Latin American coups doesn’t mean the military is always wrong (I don’t know if the Iranian elections were really stolen from the reformers either – but just because the Necons support that idea, I don’t discount it yet.)
But I’d like to disagree with some of the points in this post, please.
The idea that simple “majoritarianism” is the essence of democracy, which like a seething brute must be kept under chains by something called “constitutionalism” seems like an old aristocratic theme that carries some baggage.
A more basic way of considering democracy is simply accountability: citizens lend their sovereignty to the elected, and we get that loan back every few years, getting the chance to turf our servants out of their jobs. Majoritarianism is thus one method of ensuring accountability, it is not the goal itself.
A constitution that is not capable of being amended – nor of even being legally open to the possibility of allowing formal discussion of amendment! – is accountable to… who, exactly? To God, the military, and the five families who own the country, apparently.
And another thing: since when has any political class anywhere been necessarily the best and most responsible gauge of the welfare of the people who elect them? They tend to wind up having more in common with each other than their constituents the more comfortable they get. E.g. the political class right across Europe are determined to force the Lisbon “Constitreaty” down our throats, despite citizen’s voting it down repeatedly (France, Holland, Ireland) – but the politicians love it, because it give their class and hangers-on continental-sized power without pesky elections in the wrong places. There is an old Soviet joke – the people and the Party are one, like oil and water – that could equally apply to most if not all political classes.
I realise this doesn’t disprove El Prez shouldn’t have been turfed out in his jammies – and I’m beginning to think that it maybe even bolsters the case for it – but perhaps invoking hoi-polloi majoritarianism versus high-church constitutionalism isn’t _necessarily_ the best argument. Especially when “constitutional” can reference anything from the US libertarian tract, through the Honduran Holy-of-Holy That Shall Not Be Touched By The Great Unwashed, right down to that British gentleman’s agreement circulating in their parliamentary dictatorship.
[[Ducks, runs for cover - exit stage left]]
On the merits, I agree that this seems like a mess and the US should stay out of it.
But what do you think of the argument that silence would have been considered by everyone in Latin America to mean the US was behind the military’s action? In other words, history leaves the US no plausible way of being considered neutral.
And the “nonbinding referendum” (talk about spouting pure propaganda) was declared illegal.
No, the binding resolution was declared illegal. So Zumaya changed it to a non-binding resolution. Which the military (not the Supreme Court) declared illegal.
On what basis do you conclude Zelaya would adhere to a constitutional removal?
I don’t have to conclude that. But the Honduran government has the responsibility to move via legal means.
Just like the only basis for your conclusion that the “whole Iranian people” support Mousavi–
I don’t conclude that. I just conclude that peaceable assembly and protest is a universal human right. Unconstitutionally deposing an elected official is not.
Meanwhile, the Honduran Congress has passed an emergency decree eliminating the right to protest, freedom from unwarranted search, seizure and arrest, freedom of association, guarantees of due process, and freedom of transit.
But sure, they are the guardians of the Honduran Constitution.
All I will say is this:
If Honduras’ constitution actually does allow for THE MILITARY to unilaterally toss their president whenever they feel that he’s broken the law, with no legal evaluation of whether or not he actually did, then Honduras’ constitution is simply ridiculous.
The reported suspension of rights is a major blunder on the part of the new government, since it blurs the issue that Honduran political institutions were defending the constitution against Zelaya’s abuses. This blunder cannot be entirely separated from the absurd degree of hostility to the new government from the rest of the world. Virtually no other country on the planet is as diplomatically isolated as Honduras is today. Tell me how this makes sense given the nature of the states that go about their business without such universal international hostility. When a new government is being treated like a pariah, faces threats of military subversion or invasion by a regional neighbor, no matter how overblown those threats are, and has to contend with the ex-president’s dedicated supporters, it is not surprising if its leadership panics and goes into siege mode.
Diplomatic and economic isolationism does not make a targeted government more accommodating and reasonable, but pretty much every time makes it dig in its heels and embrace paranoia and repression in response to outside hostility. All of this isolation isn’t going to make Honduras’ internal political problems any easier to solve, and even as poor and dependent as Honduras is these measures aren’t going to dislodge the new government anytime soon. In the meantime, of course, it will be the poor who will suffer the adverse effects of trade embargoes and suspensions of aid more than any of the people the outside world is trying to penalize.
The entire world has overreacted to Zelaya’s removal, and now the new government in Honduras has overreacted, but spare me the Giordano party line about all of this. If the suspension of liberties tells us anything interesting, it is that the world’s overreaction has been counterproductive and has directly contributed to the worsening of the situation in the country. In the end, the main beneficiaries of all this pro-Zelaya activism will be those who worship executive power and disdain checks on executive abuses. Executive misrule will become more widely tolerated in the region. Whether or not the isolation forces Micheletti out, no other political leadership in Latin America will want to risk the treatment that is being meted out to Honduras for daring to try to hold their president accountable.
For what it’s worth, the suspensions and curfew appear to be temporary measures in preparation for Zelaya’s attempted return. In other words, the actions that supposedly provide damning proof of the new government’s anti-democratic nature would not even be happening if Zelaya were not attempting to escalate the crisis by coming back into the country. The more I learn about this situation, the less I trust anything Giordano has to say.
http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/07/baring-its-fangs-ctd.html#more
In certain parts of the country, the population seems to be welcoming Zelaya’s ouster as enthusiastically as many Thais did when Thaksin was overthrown.
http://www.elheraldo.hn/Secciones-Secundarias/Videos?v=8xhzctcz2ehs
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rL3TqjA_LUA
Of course, this is not definitive one way or the other. As in Iran, mass protests in cities may not be representative of the entire population and may be made up of mostly upscale citizens who already have reasons to dislike Zelaya. It is quite possible that these are all National Party enthusiasts rejoicing in Zelaya’s removal. It is also possible that pro-Zelaya rallies are being actively discouraged and broken up by the government, so that the support for him appears weaker than it really is. That said, there seem to be a great many Hondurans who are pleased with what has happened.