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Recent Writings

Posted on November 22nd, 2009 by Daniel McCarthy

The forthcoming issue of TAC includes my review of one of my favorite books of the past year — Peter Richardson’s A Bomb in Every Issue: How the Short, Unruly Life of Ramparts Magazine Changed America. Get it by subscribing to TAC here (or give a friend a gift subscription).

Meanwhile, my review of Gregory Schneider’s The Conservative Century is online at First Principles. Here’s a bite:

Gregory Schneider’s new book puts recent discussions about “the death of conservatism” in perspective, for many of the disputes that rage on the Right today have antecedents in the controversies of a century ago. Indeed, The Conservative Century (just released in paperback) begins at the turn of the twentieth century with two distinct strains of conservatism contending with one another—what Schneider calls the “laissez-faire conservatism” of such nineteenth-century thinkers as William Graham Sumner and Herbert Spencer against the “nationalist conservatism” of Theodore Roosevelt. The one side wanted smaller government, a noninterventionist foreign policy, and almost unfettered capitalism. The other believed that the federal government should exercise a strong regulatory role at home and had a mission to spread American values abroad. All this may seem disconcertingly familiar in 2009.

Neither the nationalists nor the proponents of laissez-faire typically called themselves “conservatives.” The former often styled themselves as “progressives,” the latter were classical liberals or radical individualists. But Schneider is not making a normative judgment by classing them all together as conservatives—however paradoxical it may seem, progressive nationalists and laissez-faire liberals alike strongly influenced later, self-described conservatives. The Cold War conservatism and popular Right of the mid-twentieth century drew upon national-security and free-market rhetoric (in different proportions at different times, to be sure), while throughout the postwar era noninterventionism and “Red Tory” economics have informed conservative critiques of conservatism. They represent paths not taken that nonetheless have roots on the Right as deep as those of the dominant traditions of nationalism and capitalism.

Schneider, an associate professor of history at Emporia State University, has demonstrated his understanding of the nuances of modern American conservatism before. His sourcebook Conservatism in America since 1930 was arguably the best and most diverse anthology of twentieth-century traditionalist and libertarian writing since William F. Buckley Jr.’s Have You Ever Seen a Dream Walking? Before that, Schneider’s Cadres for Conservatism, a short but comprehensive history of Young Americans for Freedom, illustrated his knack for integrating political, institutional, and intellectual histories into a coherent narrative. The Conservative Century is a successor to both earlier works: a narrative companion to Conservatism in America Since 1930 that weaves political history together with the development of conservative thought over the last century—all in a mere two hundred pages.

Lastly, a not-so-recent review of mine is now online for the first time here at TAC: my take on Robert Higgs’s Against Leviathan: Government Power and a Free Society.

The Paradox of “Self-Government”

Posted on November 21st, 2009 by Daniel McCarthy

It doesn’t limit the scope of state power at all; it expands it. This isn’t just because rulers can get away with a lot more so long as they keep up the myth that they aren’t really imposing anything on anyone else but are merely the conduit by which people govern themselves. It’s also because the modern notion of self-government tends to assume homogeneous selves — that is, while older evolved systems of government tended to take into account the diverse interests of society (church, nobility, king and courtiers, peasantry, etc.), contemporary notions of self-government usually acknowledge only a single, general public interest. Today it would be difficult even to say what different interests should be represented in government — small businesses? multiple churches? universities? — since this way of thinking is very much out of fashion, and in any case which interests were represented in government in the Middle Ages were a function of power, not design. Kings had to deal with nobles and the Church, whether they wanted to or not.

The U.S. Constitution at least tries to give representation to the interests of the several states, and there are in any event many unofficial channels (good and bad) by which the interests of other sectors of society can be represented. But in thinking about politics, it’s a good idea to keep the unreality of the singular public interest in mind. (That’s not quite the same thing as saying that a singular “national interest” is unreal — a lot of British classical British conservative thought, going back to Burke and Coleridge, is concerned with representing the interests of the whole without subverting or overriding the interests of the parts. There’s an element of that in the U.S. Constitution as well, of course.)

Conservatives should accept this readily enough. Libertarians may balk at first — surely individual rights are all that mater? — but in practice the modern state has used individual rights as a pretexts for its own powers. The old, explicit division of interests had the advantage of being a bit more transparently power-driven. The nature of the state was somewhat more clear then, as opposed to now, where a great many people think they are, or should be, the state. (And as I’ve argued before, the problem with that view is again not just that they are more easily dominated if they believe they are the dominators but also everyone begins to think his “values” should be represented in government, which results in an ongoing low-intensity war for power.)

As Noel O’Sullivan puts it in the book mentioned below:

Since reason and conscience convey different but equally convincing messages to even the most sincere and intelligent of men, the result is that the theory leaves democratic government perpetually exposed to the terrorism of groups which acknowledge only their own self-imposed principles. The ideal of self-imposed limits used to defend the democratic conception of self-government, in short, is as readily available for the subversion of constitutional government as for its defense…

But …. instead of legitimizing terrorism and creating a constant threat of anarchy, it may equally well be used to defend despotic government. It can be used for that purpose because the democratic ideal of self-government (or popular sovereignty) shifts attention away from the exercise of power to its source. … Consequently a modern government may, without absurdity, defend any policy at all, no matter how inimical to law, liberty and the security of property it may be, by merely claiming that it acted on behalf of the people, or in fulfillment of some electoral mandate.

The Trouble With Disraeli

Posted on November 13th, 2009 by Daniel McCarthy

Noel O’Sullivan puts it well:

In the Vindication of the English Constitution he had indeed professed allegiance to the ideal of a balanced constitution, and consequently insisted that the House of Commons alone could not be regarded as the representative of the nation; it was, on the contrary, merely the representative of one estate of the nation, even though that estate might be the most numerous. The ‘people,’ or the ‘nation’ as a whole, was represented only in the three mutually counterbalanced parts of the constitution — the throne, the peers, and the Commons — when taken in conjunction with one another. Disraeli could accordingly proceed to justify extension of the suffrage by maintaining that no increase in the number of voters could ever entitle the House of Commons to regard itself as the true representative of the will of the people. A number of his contemporaries, however, were not slow to point out how unrealistic unrealistic was the assumption that an elected chamber would prove to be as modest as Disraeli hoped it would be about its position in the constitution. Claiming the support of the electorate, it would hardly be likely to accept opposition to its will from the monarch or an hereditary House of Lords as entitled to the same respect as its own wishes. And that, of course, is what subsequently happened: the likelihood of a royal veto on legislative measure supported by the Commons was a remote eventuality by the time Victoria died, and the House of Lords was already on the defensive long before the Liberal onslaught upon it in the first decade of the [20th] century. It was to the idea of a strong popularly-based leadership, then, rather than to the old Burkean ideal of a balanced constitution, that Disraeli’s deeper sentiments and policies actually seemed to point.

That’s from O’Sullivan’s Conservatism, which is pretty good. In a later chapter, he describes the three-way crossroads at which traditionalists and paleos are liable to find themselves:

Let us suppose with Eliot and Dawson that the modern psyche is really rotten to the core, whether because of the decline of religion or culture, or both. In that case, only three responses are possible at the political level. One is despair, which means in practice doing nothing; the second is the advocacy of a spiritual revolution so profound that it is incompatible with a stable version of conservative ideology; whilst the third is a resort to more modest reforms which are bound, however, to appear totally inadequate remedies for the disease they are intended to cure. It is the third solution to which both Eliot and Dawson resort. Eliot writes nostalgically of the parish as an example of what he means by organic community, whilst Dawson suggests that the kind of institution which would satisfy the need for spiritual harmony, supra-political leadership and cultural unity would be one modelled upon the English public school system.

… The real challenge to the imagination of the conservative statesman is to spot those parts of a rickety structure which, when strengthened by modest reforms, will give greater stability to the whole. To attempt more than that — by reforming religion, culture, or men’s beliefs about society and the universe at large, for example — may of course be possible; but the price of success is likely to be the destruction of liberty and legality.

Asymmetrical Politics

Posted on November 5th, 2009 by Daniel McCarthy

I should clarify something from the last two posts. Running candidates who are a good fit for their district does not require that Republicans ditch their social conservative base, even if Democrats have had to run antiabortion candidates in order to win in red and conservative-blue districts. The reason for this is that abortion, and also gay marriage, are asymmetrical issues: there are significantly more anti-gay-marriage voters than pro-gay-marriage voters even in blue states like Maine and California, and while antiabortion voters may more narrowly outnumber abortion-rights voters, the intensity difference on that issue is important. For antiabortion voters, abortion is a top issue; for supporters of Roe, abortion tends to be of secondary or tertiary importance. As a purely political calculation, there’s usually no advantage for Republicans to run pro-Roe or pro-gay-marriage candidates in districts like NY-23. Doing so won’t buy the party many “moderate” votes, and will seriously aggravate the base.

Choosing the right candidate for a particular district doesn’t just mean selecting a generically liberal candidate for a liberal district. Someone like Hoffman was not too “conservative” to win NY-23. But he was too ill-versed in local issues to do himself any good.

Whose Divisions Are Worse?

Posted on November 5th, 2009 by Daniel McCarthy

Jay Cost of RealClearPolitics thinks that the gold medal for faulty analysis this election cycle should go to pundits who say NY-23 shows the Republican Party deeply divided, since, Cost says, “the GOP’s divisions - whatever they may be - are utterly, totally dwarfed by the continuing divisions in the Democratic Party. Not only in scale, but in significance. Republicans might be divided over the symbolic role of Sarah Palin in the party, but Democrats are divided over what to do about health care.”

Well, I agree that the tale of irreconcilable differences within the GOP is exaggerated, but Cost is dead wrong. The Democrats’ divisions are a source of their strength — that is, they realize that some districts require blue dog candidates, while others will accept staunch liberals — while the GOP’s differences are a source of continued fumbling. Of course you’re going to get a complicated and perhaps immobile legislative performance if you’re bringing into the party all kinds of different interests. But legislating should never be easy (it’s not meant to be), and in partisan politics winning in the first place is the prerequisite to any kind of policy.

The bigger weakness that I see in the GOP isn’t the fractiousness of their primaries or the intractability of their ideological base — the Dems have a lot of that, too — but the demands of the base and the party establishment alike for programmatic conformity. The GOP Congress never gave Bush the trouble that the Democratic Congress is giving Obama. Thus when voters looked at the wreck of the Bush administration, they rightly blamed Republicans everywhere for what Bush had done. Back in their glory days before 1994, congressional Democrats were experts at doing whatever they needed to do to create at least the appearance of putting loyalty to their districts above loyalty to party and president. In practice it was a shame, but they understood what worked. The Republicans, by contrast, have a one-boot-fits-all mentality, both in the primaries and in the legislatures. Republicans who do stick to their own consciences and their districts’ interests, like Ron Paul and Walter Jones, are targets for establishment-backed primary opposition. And of course, Bush strong-armed a great many reluctant Republican congressmen into voting for the prescription drug add-on to Medicare. The GOP demands much more conformity than the Democrats, for whom nonconformity — division — is less of a problem. (Though they certainly do have their sources of bitterness as well, as we saw in the Obama-Clinton contest. But they managed to prevent those tensions from exploding.)

The Republicans could do with a lot more productive dissension within Congress, and less tripping over their own feet in primaries. (For what it’s worth, I have a lot more respect for the Club for Growth model than Daniel Larison does. Conservatives should be content with clobbering liberal Republicans and pushing the party to the Right, even if it takes a longer time to win back power. But they should also be smart enough to reconcile a right-wing program with the diversity of regional cultures. And of course, they ought to wise up about the monstrous foreign policy they’ve been supporting, and the insincerity of movement conservatism’s professions of small-government principle. Antiwar Republicans like Hostettler got clobbered just like pro-war Republicans did in 2006 and 2008, but I suspect that was in part because there were so few antiwar Republicans that the public couldn’t believe such a thing really existed.)

Virginia, New Jersey, NY-23

Posted on November 5th, 2009 by Daniel McCarthy

I’m in the camp that says Tuesday’s election results don’t tell us much about what to expect next November. A Republican revival? Conservative comeback? That’s not exactly what NY-23 suggests; there Democrat Bill Owens beat Conservative (and virtual Republican) Doug Hoffman by sticking to the common-sense, district-specific playbook that served the Democrats well in 2006 and 2008. (Obviously, it helped the Dems that they had Bush to campaign against back then, too, but to win Republican-leaning districts like NY-23 they needed candidates who were a reasonably good fit for the community, and they found them.) Hoffman was not a strong candidate for the district; Republican nominee Scozzafava was not a good fit for the party’s ideological base. If the Republicans had been well enough organized to nominate a more locally credible candidate than Hoffman and a more conservative candidate than Scozzafava, they might have won. But that “if” contains the crux of the congressional GOP’s problem: it hasn’t been able to unify its activist base, its leadership, and political reality.

Those things did line up in the Virginia elections. It’s hard to say whether the Old Dominion is a barometer of change or not, though. The commonwealth has been perfectly counter-cyclical since the Carter years, electing Republican governors every time a Democrat is in the White House and Democratic governors every time a Republican is president. There’s a mundane explanation for that, at least going back as far as the Clinton years: Virginia is a divided state where the intensity of either side counts for a great deal. The side that occupies the White House is typically less intense — it’s playing defense — while the anger and energy is on the side of the out party. We saw that in the McDonnell-Deeds gubernatorial contest, and we saw it four years earlier when Democrat Tim Kaine prevailed. The country as a whole, like Virginia, is divided, and the activist energy is very much to the Republicans’ advantage right now. Unfortunately for the GOP, the 2010 elections will be fought district by district and state by state, where local conditions are not always close to those in Virginia or the nation as a whole. Hoffman benefited from the nationwide counter-Obama activist energy, hence the Conservative Party candidate’s great showing for out-of-state fundraising. But local realities trumped that.

The tilt of the playing field in 2010 will favor Republicans, but they still have to play a good enough game to take advantage of it. I do expect them to make gains, but not the huge gains that the base is expecting — not enough to take back either chamber, at least as things stand now. (What happens to the economy over the next year will naturally make a tremendous difference either way.)

New Jersey defied my guess that Corzine would pull through. My prediction was down to the heavily Democratic lean of the state and the tendency of Republican senate and gubernatorial candidates time and again to start strong but ultimately fall short. New Jersey has elected and re-elected plenty of crooked, creepy Democrats before. But Corzine’s luck ran out. I tend to think that the Garden State is less reflective of the direction of the country than Virginia is, however. Certainly Democrats have pulled through in unfavorable conditions there before. The real contest in New Jersey is usually not between conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats, but between Democrats and their own corruption. The moderate Republican Christie was the “not Corzine” choice.

Reappraising the Right

Posted on November 3rd, 2009 by Daniel McCarthy

I have a review of the new book by George H. Nash, dean of conservative historians, up at History News Network here.

A(ristotle) is A(lbert Jay Nock)

Posted on October 29th, 2009 by Daniel McCarthy

Ayn Rand acknowledged Aristotle as the only thinker to whom she owed a “philosophical debt.” But Rand’s Aristotle was, in at least one instance, really Albert Jay Nock’s Aristotle, as this footnote in Jennifer Burns’s Goddess of the Market: Ayn Rand and the American Right reveals:

Her late use of Aristotle was often inaccurate. According to Rand, Aristotle believed that ‘history represents things as they are, while fiction represents them as they might be and ought to be.’ However, as two scholars sympathetic to Rand conclude, this attribution ‘misquotes Aristotle and misrepresents his intent.’ … It appears that Rand drew this concept not from Aristotle, but from Albert Jay Nock. In Memoirs of a Superfluous Man (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943), 191, Nock writes, ‘History, Aristotle says, represents things only as they are, while fiction represents them as they might be and ought to be.’ In her copy of the book, Rand marked this apssage with six vertical lines.

For more on Rand and Goddess of the Market, see Justin Raimondo’s review here.

The GOP’s Generational Time Bomb

Posted on October 29th, 2009 by Daniel McCarthy

The GOP might do reasonably well next week, with Republican Bob McDonnell set to coast to victory in Virginia’s gubernatorial contest, though I suspect New Jersey might again (as always) dash the party’s hopes. I suspect Democratic incumbent John Corzine will pull through in the Garden State. I have no idea what will happen in NY-23, the Scozzaffava/Hoffman/Owens race — can polls showing Conservative Party candidate Doug Hoffman in the lead be believed? Jim Antle has a good piece on the race and its implications here.

Between being competitive in these races and a rather favorable climate developing for the 2010 midterms, the GOP might seem to have floated out of its doldrums without liquidating its leadership or examining at all seriously what went wrong during the Bush years. But there’s something in the offing that should worry the Republican establishment a bit: the party still looks to have little in the way of a future, with younger Americans leaning heavily Democratic and “liberal.” Where there does seem to be activist energy and passion on the young Right, it’s in the Ron Paul camp, which the GOP still prefers to ignore. A few months ago I took a look at this subject in the mag put out by Young Americans for Liberty. That piece, “The Battle for America’s Youth,” is now online here. The youth vote won’t be a big problem for the GOP in 2010 because chances are very few young people will bother going to the polls. But in the decades to come, the cohort that voted strongly for Obama in 2008 is likely to continue to vote Democratic, which will have larger consequences once they start going to the polls more regularly as they age. The GOP won’t be able to offset that trend by rallying around the dead-end politics of George W. Bush, even repackaged in the shape of Sarah Palin. Any success the party enjoys in the near term only postpones the reckoning that must come.

Not the Death of Print

Posted on October 29th, 2009 by Daniel McCarthy

This article gets a lot right — the death of newspapers has been exaggerated. They still sell, though sales are falling, and they’re still profitable. The smart ones are becoming more profitable even as sales decline — in other words, they have a product that has been underpriced until now. What’s happening to the newspaper industry is not only a function of the Internet muscling in, though that’s a large part of it, but also the general fragmentation of media that has been going on since the introduction of cable television. There will still be newspapers for a long time to come; what there may or may not be are newspapers that can pose as national institutions. One reason the Wall Street Journal is beat its rivals is that, unlike USA Today or the New York Times, it doesn’t pretend to be a national everyman’s newspaper. The WSJ isn’t a mass-consumer product, it’s a niche product with a huge niche — businessmen. The paper focuses on giving that market value for its money. The New York Times, by contrast, is still catering to a general market that has been in decline for 20 years. The paper’s prestige held up sales against the centrifugal forces of the market for a time, but that clock has since run out. What the likes of USA Today and the NYT are going to have to do is find a large niche in which to specialize, but that runs hard against their institutional identities.