Why Engage?
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The hope behind an engagement strategy was that the Supreme Leader might be inclined to side with the more pragmatic actors inside the system—guys like former president Rafsanjani and former prime minister Mousavi. With those people, and most of the Iranian elites of their ilk, now in open opposition to the regime, any crackdown would almost by definition entail the sidelining of the people who might be interested in a deal. Iran would essentially be in the hands of the most hardline figures, people who just don’t seem interested in improving relations with other countries. ~ Matthew Yglesias
Eric Martin has already taken this argument apart quite effectively, but one further point is worth emphasizing, namely that it seems a mistake to think that the Iranian regime’s goal in hypothetical negotiations with the U.S. would ever have been driven by an intrinsic interest in “improving relations with other countries”. Surely Yglesias would agree that the regime’s recent actions have made it quite clear that they are interested in some things, and that there are (“pragmatic”) steps they are willing to take to ensure that those interests are advanced. But it was never very likely that the Iranians would go in for negotiations simply for their own sake, as if the promise of being granted the “friendship of the U.S.” or the “respect of the international community” was itself going to bring Iran to the bargaining table; rather, just as the American interest in engaging Iran involves straightforward means-end calculations about how best to achieve our foreign and domestic goals, so too the hope was that the Iranians would see negotiations with the U.S. as a way to achieve others of their various desiderata, not as an end desirable in its own right. The crucial task, as ever, is to identify what those desiderata are and convince the regime that a willingness to deal will ultimately help to reach them: there is no need to worry about Khamenei’s evident disregard for his nation’s image abroad.
P.S. For more on “pragmatism” see Daniel, who could just as well be responding to David Brooks.
Filed under: foreign affairs
I think the important question to ask is whether we think we might be in a better strategic position vis-a-vis Iran now had we not severed diplomatic ties with their government. I think the answer is yes, and I think that is enough of a reason to pursue talks with the regime regardless.
I would hope that people have now learned that Iran is not a monolithic society of crazy mullahs, contra the neocon portrayal. There is a large population which is unhappy with the strict religious rules, economic stagnation and foreign policy of the Supreme Leader. We start with such a low baseline of credibility there because of our part there in 1953 and our support of the Shah. Recent public statements about bombing Iran do not help either. Long term positive engagement has the potential of bringing those unhappy with Khameini an option for foreign policy. They may still reject it, but it is a possibility. Please notice that in almost every Petraeus guidance statement, and in McChrystal’s new guidance statement, there is emphasis on living up to our values. Put another way, as John Boyd would have it, the moral component of conflict is the most important. Let’s maintain that moral advantage.
Steve
[...] only seen pieces of, by calling it constitutional and less awful than Tiananmen. Eric Martin and John Schwenkler are able to advocate for engagement without prettying up the [...]
[...] only seen pieces of, by calling it constitutional and less awful than Tiananmen. Eric Martin and John Schwenkler are able to advocate for engagement without prettying up the [...]